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INTRODUCTION 
In proving a case of adverse disparate impact discrimination 
under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, a plaintiff in its prima 
facie case must show a significant disparity between an affected 
population and an appropriate comparison population. Both gov-
ernment agencies and commentators have neglected to address the 
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crucial issue of how to ~elect and define a comparison population. 
Title VI cases often look to Title VII cases for guidance. Title VII 
cases require that a comparison population should be similarly situ-
ated to the affected population. In 2000, the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency ("the EPA" or "the Agency") issued draft Title VI 
guidance addressing this issue, but the Agency failed to address 
how to select a similarly situated comparison population. Business 
commentators have proposed an overly restrictive test requiring 
that both the affected area and comparison population contain 
very similar land uses. For example, business commentators sug-
gest it would be inappropriate in many cases to compare a poor, 
urban area with an affluent suburban area. 
This Article proposes that a comparison population is similarly 
situated with an affected popUlation if the comparison area meets 
the minimum relevant requirements for the proposed facility. This 
test is consistent with Title VII cases requiring that comparisons be 
made between qualified workers in the same relevant job market. 
The proposed test would allow comparisons between poor, heavily 
minority areas and affluent suburban areas as long as the facility 
could be sited in either area. The Article addresses how the EPA 
can use existing information to select comparison areas and the 
special problems presented by local zoning restrictions. 
Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits federal agencies 
from providing financial assistance to recipients that commit dis-
crimination on the basis of "race, color or national origin .... "1 
Title VI clearly prohibits recipients from engaging in intentional 
discrimination that results in disparate treatment of protected 
groupS.2 Additionally, the Supreme Court has recognized that fed-
eral agencies may adopt' Title VI implementing regulations that 
prohibit recipients of federal funds from using criteria or methods 
that cause an unjustified disparate impact on protected groups, 
even if the practices or actions are not intentionally discrimina-
tory.3 The EPA's Title VI regulations prohibit its recipients, which 
include almost all state environmental agencies, from taking 
1 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C § 2000d (1994). 
2 Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 292-93 (1985); Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Servo 
Comm'n,463 U.S. 582 (1983). 
3 Alexander V. Choate, 469 U.S. at 292-94; Guardians Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 618 (Marshall, 
J., dissenting) (stating that recipients may not use "criteria or methods of administration 
which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination," according to 45 CF.R. 
§ 80.3(b)(2) (1964)); Guardians Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 592 n.13 (observing that "every Cabinet 
department and about 40 federal agencies adopted Title VI regulations prohibiting dispa-
rate-impact discrimination"). 
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actions that cause either intentional discrirriination or unintentional 
disparate impact discrimination to protected minority groupS.4 On 
June 27, 2000, the EPA published the Draft Revised Guidance for 
. Investigating Title VI Administrative Complaints Challenging Per-
mits ("Revised Investigation Guidance") to clarify when a permit 
decision by a recipient may cause adverse, unjustified disparate 
impacts that violate Title VJ.5 
In determining whether a decision causes adverse, unjustified 
disparate impacts, a decision-maker must compare the level of 
adverse impacts experienced by the affected population to an 
appropriate comparison population.1i The EPA and most commen-
tators have focused on defining the scope of the affected popula-
tion and paid far less attention to the issue of defining an 
appropriate comparison population.7 Yet whether a court or gov-
ernment agency finds a significant and unjustified disparity often 
depends on the size and characteristics of the comparison 
population.s 
The Revised Investigation Guidance's approach to defining com-
parison populations is inadequate in light of Title VI and VII case 
law because there is no requirement that a comparison population 
. be similarly situated to the affected population. While Title VII 
cases initially allowed plaintiffs to compare an allegedly affected 
minority population to a general population, subsequent Supreme 
Court decisions have required a plaintiff, in establishing a prima 
facie case of discrimination, to compare a group that is allegedly 
4 "A recipient [of federal funds] shall not use criteria or methods of administering its 
program which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their 
race, color, [or] national origin ... "40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b) (2000); see generally 40 C.F.R. pt. 7 
(2000); Bradford C. Mank, Title VI, in THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 25-26 
(Michael Gerrard ed., 1999) [hereinafter Mank, Title VI]; Bradford C. Mank, Is There a 
Private Cause of Action Under EPA's Title VI Regulations?, 24 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 17 
(1999) [hereinafter Mank, Private Cause of Action]. 
5 Draft Title VI Guidance for EPA Assistance Recipients Administering Environmental 
Permitting Programs [hereinafter Recipient Guidance] and Draft Revised Guidance for 
Investigating Title VI Administrative Complaints Challenging Permits [hereinafter 
Revised Investigation Guidance, and, together with Recipient Guidance, hereinafter Gui-
dance], 65 Fed. Reg. 39,650, 39,651-54 (proposed June 27, 2000). In the Recipient Gui-
dance included in this draft, EPA discussed a range of possible approaches to minimize the 
likelihood that a complaint will be filed against a recipient. Id. at 39,651-52, 39,655. See 
generally Bradford C. Mank, The Draft Recipient Guidance and Draft Revised Investigation 
Guidance: Too Much Discretion for the EPA and a More Difficult Standard for Complain-
ants?, 30 ENYTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 11,144 (2000) [hereinafter Mank, Draft 
Guidance]. 
6 See supra notes 1-5. 
7 See supra notes 1-5. 
8 See supra notes 1-5. 
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the victim of discrimination with qualified persons in the relevant 
job marketY Courts in Title VI cases often look to Title VII deci-
sions for guidance, so Title VII cases defining an appropriate com-
parison group are therefore helpful in addressing the same 
question under Title VI. 1U While the EPA is not technically bound 
by Title VII cases, the Department of Justice in its Title VI Legal 
Manual recognizes that "Title VI disparate impact claims are ana-
lyzed using principles similar to those used to analyze Title VII dis-
parate impact claims."!! Although it is unclear to what extent 
courts will give deference to the Agency's Title VI guidance, it is 
likely that courts will give more deference to the Title VI guidance 
if it is firmly grounded in Title VI and VII case law. Accordingly, 
the EPA should carefully consider Title VII precedent demanding 
an appropriate comparison population be similarly situated to the 
affected population. 
A distinction must be made between the use of general popula-
tion statistics to make initial identifications of possible high-risk 
areas and using those same statistics to make a formal comparison 
to determine liability under Title VI. It is appropriate for the EPA 
or states to use general population statistics as part of a process in 
which they initially identify areas that may have high amounts of 
pollution or potential disparate impacts and then compare the pol-
lution levels in such areas with statewide averages.!2 Accordingly, 
as part of a program to avoid potential disparities, it is frequently 
acceptable for states or the EPA to compare a potentially affected 
population with general population statistics. Furthermore, if a 
facility could be sited anywhere in a recipient's jurisdiction, it may 
sometimes be appropriate to use a general population as the appli-
cable comparison grouP. in making a final determination as· to 
whether an affected population is disproportionately affected by 
disparate impacts. 
Nevertheless, in light of Title VII law, the EPA should not auto-
matically use a general population as the appropriate comparison 
group, or even the non-affected sub-population of the general pop-
9 See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642, 650-51 (1989); infra notes 
153-82. 
10 See Elston v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1406-07 (11th CiT. 1993); 
infra note 123. 
11 Civil Rights Division, Department of Justice, TITLE VI LEGAL MANUAL 287 http:// 
www.usdoj.gov/crt/cor/coord/vimanual.htm (Jan. 11, 2001) [hereinafter TITLE VI LEGAL 
MANUAL] (citing Young v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 922 F. Supp. 544, 549 (M.D. 
Ala. 1996». 
12 See infra notes 188-94. 
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ulation, in making legal determinations about whether a recipient 
has violated Title VI. Instead, the agency should first define the 
appropriate comparison area based not just on the recipient's juris-
dictional authority, but also on whether the facility at issue in the 
affected area could be sited in the proposed comparison area. 13 If 
minority job applicants must be compared to a relevant labor mar-
ket rather than just the general population, then the EPA should 
compare an affected population with a comparison population that 
is located in an area that could have been a possible site for the 
facility. Accordingly, if a public transportation project could only 
be built in certain urban areas, then the affected population should 
be compared to the populations in those urban areas, rather than 
the state-wide population. 14 Some might argue that the defendant 
or recipient has the burden of showing as a valid business necessity 
that certain areas are unsuitable for the facility.ls Yet in defining a 
relevant comparison group, the plaintiff has a duty to show that the 
comparison group is similarly situated enough to compare it to the 
affected population. 16 
On the other hand, a comparison area does not have to be the 
same as th,e affected area to be similarly situated as long as the 
comparison area is suitable for the facility at issue, meeting all rele-
vant objective minimum requirements. Some business trade 
associations have proposed an overly restrictive definition of "simi-
larly situated" by contending that a comparison population must be 
in an area very similar to the affected population, having a similar 
range of residential, industrial and commercial uses. 17 There is 
some confusion in Title VII law about whether a plaintiff must 
address relative qualifications in its prima facie case and hence 
consider such issues in delineating an appropriate comparison pop-
ulation. Most courts simply require a plaintiff's prima facie case to 
address objective, minimum qualifications, however, and place the 
burden on the defendant to show that it hired better qualified 
13 See infra notes 198-200, 206-07, 213, and 225. 
14 See infra notes 198-200, 206-07, 213, and 225. 
15 See infra notes 213-28. 
16 See infra notes 198-200, 206-07, 213, and 225. 
17 See AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, COMMENTS ON "DRAFT REVISED GUIDANCE 
FOR INVESTIGATING TITLE VI ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINTS CHALLENGING PERMITS" 11 
http://www.epa.gov/ocrpage1/docs/t6com2000_052.pdf (Aug. 28, 2000) [hereinafter API]; 
THE BUSINESS NETWORK FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, COMMENTS ON "DRAFT REVISED 
GUIDANCE FOR INVESTIGATING TITLE VI ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINTS CHALLENGING 
PERMITS" 19-20 (Aug. 28, 2000) http://www.epa.gov/ocrpagelldocs/t6com2000_054.pdf 
[hereinafter BNEl]; Mank, Draft Guidance, supra note 5, at 11,169 (citing BNEJ). 
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workers than the plaintiffs. III Accordingly, in Title VII cases, courts 
have required a basic similarity in selecting a comparison popula-
tion that consists of qualified applicants in the relevant job market, 
but have not demanded that a comparison population be nearly the 
same in every relevant characteristic. It) For example, in Title VII 
cases, minority job applicants do not need to have the same educa-
tional or occupational characteristics as an appropriate comparison 
population, as long as they are qualified for the job at issue. In the 
context of environmental permits, the best test for whether a com-
parison population is similarly situated is usually if the proposed 
facility in the affected area could also be sited in the comparison 
area.20 . 
To determine whether a comparison area is similarly situated, 
the EPA should start by examining existing information from per-
mit applications, but may need to encourage states and permit 
applicants to provide additional information. Some of the informa-
tion that the Agency needs to define an appropriate comparison 
population may be available from existing state and federal permit-
ting requirements. For example, because many state siting statutes 
already require apermit applicant to propose or consider a number 
of different locations for a proposed facility, existing siting and per-
mitting processes already generate some of the information that 
would be useful in defining what is an appropriate comparison 
population.21 Additionally, several federal environmental statutes, 
most notably the National Environmental Policy Act, require the 
government to evaluate alternatives to a proposed project, and this 
information could prove useful in selecting an appropriate compar-
ison population.22 Furthermore, the EPA, in both the Revised 
Investigation Guidance and the Recipient Guidance, encourages 
states to collect demographic information and pollution data about 
high risk populations, and this information could prove useful in 
selecting both the affected population and an appropriate compari-
son populationY 
Nevertheless, in investigating and resolving Title VI administra-
tive complaints, the EPA has ultimate responsibility in researching 
and assessing any disputed factual issues. If any necessary informa-
18 See infra notes 213·28. 
19 See infra notes 203-07. 
20 See supra notes 13-16 and infra notes 198-200,206-07,213, and 225. 
21 See infra notes 270-85. 
22 See infra notes 287-90. 
23 See infra notes 286, 291-302. 
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tion about comparison populations is not available, the EPA 
should work with recipients and complainants to develop such 
information. Moreover, the EPA should develop guidelines for 
determining appropriate comparison populations. In selecting a 
comparison population, the Agency needs to evaluate whether a 
recipient's siting criteria are legitimate minimum requirements or 
whether the recipient's criteria are likely to be masks for discrimi-
natory decisions. An especially sensitive problem is the role of 
local land use restrictions that may be beyond the authority of the 
recipient, but may effectively foreclose some areas from considera-
tion. The EPA should examine whether the recipient can preempt, 
mitigate or avoid discriminatory local land use regulations. By 
carefully evaluating a recipient's siting criteria to determine 
whether all stated criteria are legitimate and selecting appropriate 
comparison populations, the EPA can improve its process for ana-
lyzing Title VI disparate impact complaints. 
1. EVIDENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL INEQUITIES 
Several studies have found that racial minority and low-income 
groups disproportionately live near polluting industries and solid 
and hazardous waste treatment and disposal facilities,z4 For exam-
24 See Robert R. Kuehn, A Taxonomy of Environmental Justice, 30 ENVTL. L. INST. 
(10681, nn. 34-37 (2000) (summarizing several studies finding evidence of environmental 
discrimination) [hereinafter Kuehn, A Taxonomy of Environmental Justice]; Vicki Been & 
Francis Gupta, Coming to the Nuisance or Going to the Barrios: A Longitudinal Analysis of 
Environmental Justice Claims, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1,9,19-27,33-34 (1997) (using 1990 cen-
sus data, examining 544 communities that hosted active commercial hazardous waste treat-
ment storage and disposal facilities, and finding no substantial evidence that commercial 
hazardous waste facilities that began operating between 1970 and 1990 were sited in areas 
that were disproportionately African American or that had high concentrations of the 
poor, but finding evidence that Hispanics were disproportionately more likely to live near 
such facilities); John A. Hird & Michael Reese, The Distribution of Environmental Quality: 
An Empirical Analysis, 79 Soc. SCI. Q. 693, 707-11 (1998) (finding "[e]ven when numerous 
other potentially relevant variables are included in the analysis, race and ethnicity remain 
strongly associated with environmental quality, with both nonwhite and Hispanic popula-
tions experiencing disproportionately high pollution levels," but not finding low income 
levels to be associated with higher levels of pollution); Evan J. Ringquist, Equity and the 
Distriblllion of Environmental Risk: The Case of TRI Facilities, 78 Soc. SCI. Q. 811 (1997) 
(finding Toxic Release Inventory facilities and pollutants are concentrated in residential 
ZIP codes with large minority populations); J. Tom Boer et a!., Is There Environmental 
Racism? The Demographics of Hazardous Waste in Los Angeles County, 78 Soc. SCI. Q. 
793 (1997) (finding working class communities of color in industrial areas of Los Angeles 
are most affected by hazardous waste treatment storage and disposal facilities); Robert D. 
Bullard, Solid Waste and the Black HOt/ston Community, 53 Soc. INQUIRY 273, 279-83 
(1983) (finding that although African-Americans made up only 28% of the Houston popu-
lation in ] 980, six of Houston's eight incinerators and mini-incinerators and fifteen of sev-
enteen landfills were located in predominantly African-American neighborhoods); UNITED 
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pIe, in 1987 and in an updated 1994 study, the United Church of 
Christ Commission for Racial Justice (the "Church") examined the 
location of all commercial hazardous waste facilities in the contigu-
ous United States that could be identified through the EPA's Haz-
ardous Waste Data Management System, and concluded that racial 
disparities existed even after controlling for income differences.25 
The Church's 1987 report concluded that "race was consistently a 
more prominent factor in the location of commercial hazardous 
waste facilities than any other factor examined."26 
Minority and low-income populations are more likely to live in 
areas with high amounts of pollution.27 Additionally, cities are 
more likely to locate industrial or commercial zoning in low-
income, high-minority census tracts than in high-income, low-
CHURCH OF CHRIST COMM'N FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, TOXIC WASTES AND RACE IN THE 
UNITED STATES (1987), discussed in Charles Lee, Toxic Waste and Race in the United 
States, 10-27, in RACE AND THE INCIDENCE OF ENVIROMENTAL HAZARDS: A TIME FOR 
DISCOURSE (Bunyan Bryant & Paul Mohai eds., Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press 1992) 
[hereinafter UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST COMM'N FOR RACIAL JUSTICE], (involving a 
study of the location of all 415 commercial hazardous waste facilities in the contiguous 
United States that could be identified through the EPA's Hazardous Waste Data Manage-
ment System concluded, using zip code areas to define minority and non-minority areas, 
that "[a]lthough socioeconomic status appeared to play an important role in the location of 
commercial hazardous waste facilities, race still proved to be more significant"); BENJAMIN 
A. GOLDMAN & LAURA FITTON, TOXIC WASTES AND RACE REVISITED (1994) (involving 
an updated study by the United Church of Christ, relying on zip code areas, finding that 
the location of hazardous waste facilities reflects a national pattern of racial inequality that 
has deteriorated during the past decade); Bradford C. Mank; Environmental Justice, in 2 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW PRACTICE GUIDE 12B.0I[1][d, eJ (Michael Gerrard ed., 1999); 
Bradford C. Mank, Environmental Justice and Discriminatory Siting: Risk-Based Represen-
tation and Equitable Compensation, 56 OHIO ST. LJ. 329, 334-41 (1995) (summarizing 
studies finding racial minorities and low-income 'persons disproportionately live near pollu-
tion) [hereinafter Mank, Discriminatory Siting]; Daniel R. Faber & Eric J. Krieg, Unequal 
Exposure to Ecological Hazards: Environmental Injustices in the Commonwealth of Massa-
chusetts at http://www.nupr.neu.edu/news/0012/environment.pdf (Jan. 9, 2001) (finding 
Massachusetts communities where people of color comprise more than fifteen percent of 
population are substantially more likely to live near hazardous waste sites or high levels of 
pollution than communities with small minority popUlations). 
25 See generally GOLDMAN & FITTON, supra note 24; UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST 
COMM'N FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, supra note 24. 
26 UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST COMM'N FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, supra note 24, at 15. 
27 See Rodger C. Field, Siting, Justice, and the Environmental Laws, 16 N. ILL. U. L. 
REV. 639, 641 (1996) (stating that African Americans are 40 percent more likely to live in 
an area that does not attain the national ambient air quality standards, and Latinos are 90 
percent more likely than Whites); Robert R. Kuehn, The Environmental Justice Implica-
tions of Quantitative Risk Assessment, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 103, 118 1996 [hereinafter 
Kuehn, Quantitative Risk Assessment]; Faber & Krieg, supra note 24, at 13 (finding Massa-
chusetts communities where people of color comprise more than fifteen percent of popula-
tion are substantially more likely to live near high levels of pollution than communities 
with small minority populations); Mank, Environmental Justice, supra note 24, at 339. 
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minority areas.2X Furthermore, there also exists some evidence 
that minority groups are disproportionately exposed to multiple 
sources of pollution.29 
Other studies, however, have found no statistically significant 
difference in the percentage of minority populations in areas with 
commercial hazardous waste facilities.3° For example, a sophisti-
cated study sponsored by the EPA found statistically significant 
evidence of disparities in the location of hazardous waste facilities 
28 Craig Anthony Arnold, Planning Milagros: Environmental Justice and Land Use Reg-
ulation, 76 DENV. U. L. REV. 1,80-89 (1998) (finding in study of 31 census tracts in seven 
cities nationwide that industrial and commercial zoning is more common in low-income, 
high-minority neighborhoods than in high-income, low-minority neighborhoods). See also 
Yale Rabin, Expulsive Zoning: The Inequitable Legacy of Euclid, in ZONING AND THE 
AMERICAN DREAM 101-20 (Chailes M. Haar & Jerold S. Kayden, eds., 1990) (presenting 
case studies of "expulsive zoning" where cities from 1917 through at least the 1930s re-
zoned minority residential areas to allow intensive industrial or commercial use, often with 
intent to reduce minority populations); infra note 313. 
29 Robert W. Collin & Robin Morris Collin, The Role of Communities in Environmental 
Decisions: Communities Speaking for Themselves, 13 J. ENVTL. L. & LlTlG. 37, 55-57 
(1998); James H. Hamilton' & W. Kip' Viscusi, The Benefits and Costs of Regulatory 
Reforms for Superfund, 16 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 159, 180 (1997) (finding some minority 
groups are more likely to live near Superfund sites and to be exposed to multiple chemi-
cals); Hird & Reese, supra note 24, at 709-10; Bradford C. Mank, Reforming State Brown-
field Programs to Comply with Title VI, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 115, 141-43 (2000) 
[hereinafter Mank, Reforming State Brownfield Programs). But see Vicki Ferstel, Scholar 
Urges More Debate, BATON ROUGE ADVOCATE, Jan. 6, 1999, at 1 B (reporting that Chris-
topher H. Foreman, senior fellow at Brookings Institution, argues there is no proof that 
different pollutants interact to create multiple, cumulative and synergistic risk). 
30 Studies finding no racial disparities are often based on census tract data as opposed to 
those based on zip code areas. See Thomas Lambert & Christopher Boerner, Environmen-
tal Inequity: Economic Causes, Economic Solutions, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 195, 203-04 (1997) 
(using data from 1970, 1980, and 1990 censuses, and finding no statistical relationship 
between active hazardous and solid waste storage facilities and incinerators and minority 
residents in St. Louis, but some weak relationship between minority and poor residents 
and facilities if inactive sites are added to the data set). See generally CHRISTOPHER H. 
FOREMAN, JR., THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 18-27 (1998) (sum-
marizing conflicting studies about whether hazardous waste sites are disproportionately 
located in minority population areas and arguing there is only weak evidence of dispropor-
tionate siting or exposure); U.S. GAO, Hazardous and Nonhazardous Waste: 
Demographics of People Living Near Waste Facilities 4 (1995); Douglas L. Anderton et a\., 
Environmental Equity: The Demographics of Dumping, 31 DEMOGRAPHY 229 (1994) 
(reporting analysis based on 1980 census data); James Hamilton, Politics and Social Costs: 
Estimating the Impact of Collective Action on Hazardous Waste Facilities, 24 RAND J. 
ECON. 101, 117-18 (1993); Kuehn, A Taxonomy of Environmental Justice, supra note 24, at 
n. 41 (summarizing several studies finding no evidence of environmental discrimination); 
Mank, Environmental Justice, supra note 24, at 12B.01[e] (summarizing several studies 
finding no evidence of environmental discrimination). 
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in Hispanic areas, but no statistically significant evidence of dispar-
ities with respect to African Americans or poor communities?' 
Sometimes studies of environmental discrimination disagree 
because they use different units of comparison.32 For instance, a 
study examining the percentage of minorities in the census tract 
surrounding a facility is likely to reach a different result than a 
study assessing minority populations in the surrounding zip code 
area because the latter area is usually larger than a census tract.33 
Some studies have suggested that any disparities between minor-
ities and whites in the location of hazardous facilities may be 
caused by subsequent events after the initial siting process, such as 
minorities "moving toward a nuisance" because land becomes 
cheaper after an undesirable facility is sited, although the most 
comprehensive national study of this issue failed to find such evi-
dence.34 If minorities in fact "moved to the nuisance," a court 
31 Been & Gupta, supra note 24, at 9, 19-27,33-34 (using 1990 census data, examining 
544 communities that hosted active commercial hazardous waste treatment storage and 
disposal facilities, and finding no substantial evidence that commercial hazardous waste 
facilities that began operating' between 1970 and 1990 were sited in areas that were dispro-
portionately African American or with high concentrations of poor, but did find evidence 
that Hispanics were disproportionately more likely to live near such facilities). 
32 See generally Mank, Discriminatory Siting, supra note 24, at 343 n.59, 390-92 & n.373 
(discussing how use of different definitions of subpopulations or geographical areas can 
dramatically affect research results); Paul Mohai, The Demographics of Dumping Revis-
ited: Examining the Impact of Alternate Methodologies in Environmental Justice Research, 
14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 615 (1995) (discussing measures used in assessing site locations for 
dumping); Rae Zimmerman, Issues of Classification in Environmellfal Equity: How We 
Manage Is How We Measure, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.1. 633, 665-69 (1994); John J. Fah-
sbender, Comment, All Analytical Approach to Defining the Affected Neighborhood ill the 
Environmental Justice Context, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. REV. 120,157-69 (1996) (discussing a 
number of different environmental justice studies using different units of comparison). 
33 See Vicki Been, Locally Undesirable Land Uses in Minority Neighborhoods: Dispro-
portionate Siting or Market Dynamics?, 103 YALE L.J. 1383,1401 n.73, 1402-03 n.84 (1994) 
(arguing census tracts are more reliable means to define community than zip code areas) 
[hereinafter Been, Market Dynamics]; Been & Gupta, supra note 24, at 10-13 (citing 
sources and contending census tracts are generally more reliable means to define commu-
nity than zip code areas). 
34 Compare Lambert & Boerner, supra note 30, at 205 (using data from 1970, 1980, and 
1990 censuses, examining housing patterns around hazardous and solid waste disposal facil-
ities and incinerators in St. Louis, and finding evidence that Whites tended to move away 
from such facilities at a faster rate than minorities and that "white flight" led to an increas-
ing proportion of minorities near such facilities) with Been & Gupta, supra note 24, at 9, 
27-30, 34 (using 1990 census data, examining 544 communities that hosted active commer-
cial hazardous waste treatment storage and disposal facilities, and finding little evidence 
that the siting of a facility was followed by substantial changes in a neighborhood's socio-
economic status or racial or ethnic composition). . 
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would likely reject a disparate impact suit because a facility devel-
oper would not be responsible.35 
However, some environmental justice advocates would argue 
that even if minorities actually moved toward' an existing facility, a 
state permitting agency considering renewal of the facility's permit 
would still have a duty under Title VI to at'least minimize any 
adverse disparate impacts because there is no absolute right to 
have a permit renewed if, for whatever reason, it causes significant 
adverse disparate impacts. Many environmental justice advocates 
contend that any differences between minority and majority areas 
in terms of land use are often the result of historical discrimination 
in zoning, racial steering or other discriminatory practices?6 
Existing studies of environmental inequities have generally not 
focused on the problem of defining appropriate comparison popu-
lations. To determine whether disparities alleged in a Title VI 
complaint are significant or unjustified, the EPA needs to develop 
more refined approaches for both defining the scope of the 
affected population and selecting a similarly situated comparison 
popUlation. ' . 
II. THE EPA's TITLE VI PROGRAM 
A. Title VI and EPA's Title VI Regulations 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids intentional dis-
crimination by programs or activities receiving federal financial 
assistance?7 Section 602 of Title VI requires federal funding agen-
cies to adopt and enforce regulations that prohibit recipients from 
engaging in discrimination and that establish a process for investi-
gating possible violations by recipients.38 Since 1964, all federal 
35 Been, Market Dynamics, supra note 33, at 1384-85, 1385-92, 1400-01; Michael Fisher, 
Environmental Racism Claims Brought Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, 25 ENVTL.L. 
285, 294-96 (1995). 
36 See Arnold, supra note 28, at 80-89 (finding in study of 31 census tracts in seven cities 
nationwide that industrial and commercial zoning is more common in low-income, high-
minority neighborhoods than in high-income, low-minority neighborhoods); Sheila Foster, 
Justice from the Ground Up: Distributive Inequities, Grassroots Resistance, and the Trans-
formative Politics of the Environmental Justice Movement, 86 CAL. L. REV. 775, 833-37 
(1998); Mank, Reforming State Brownfield Programs, supra note 29, at 118, 175. 
37 Section 601 of the statute provides that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the 
ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the 
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Fed-
eral financial assistance." Civil Rights Act of ·1964,42 U.S.c. § 2000d (1994); Mank, Title 
VI, supra note 4, at 23-25. 
3M 42 U.S.c. § 2000d-1; Mank, Title VI, supra note 4, at 25; Mank, Private Cause of 
Action, supra note 4, at 12. 
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agencies have adopted implementing regulations that prohibit 
recipients from taking actions that cause either intentional discrim-
ination or unjustified disparate impacts against protected minority 
groupS.39 In 1983, in Guardians Association v. Civil Service Com-
mission,40 the Supreme Court held that section 601 of Title VI pro-
hibits recipients of federal funding from engaging in intentional 
discrimination, and a majority of five members also indicated that 
federal agencies may issue implementing regulations pursuant to 
section 602 that prohibit recipients from taking actions that cause 
unintentional, unjustified disparate impact discrimination.41 While 
some commentators have questioned whether Guardians clearly 
authorized disparate impact regulations under Title VI, in 1985, in 
Alexander v. Choate,42 the Supreme Court stated in dicta: "The 
[Guardians] Court held that actions having an unjustifiable, dispa-
rate impact on minorities could be redressed through agency regu-
lations designed to implement the purposes of Title VI."43 The 
Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 clarified that Title VI and its 
regulations apply to "all of the operations" of a state or local gov-
ernment agency that receives any federal assistance.44 
Because virtually all state environmental permitting agencies 
receive federal financial assistance, Title VI and its regulations 
apply to state permitting decisions.45 The EPA's Revised Investi-
3Y Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Servo Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 618 (1983) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting) (recipients may not use '"'criteria or methods of administration which have the 
effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination,'" quoting 45 C.F.R. * 80.3(b)(2) (1964»; 
Guardians Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 592 n.13 (observing "every Cabinet department and about 
forty agencies adopted Title VI regulations prohibiting disparate-impact discrimination."). 
See Mank, Private Cause of Action, supra note 4, at 13; Mank, Title VI, supra note 4, at 25. 
See also Paul K. Sonn, Note, Fighting Minority Underrepresentation in Publicly Funded 
Construction Projects After Croson: A Title V I Litigation Strategy, 101 YALE L.J. 1577, 1581 
n.25 (1992) (listing Title VI regulations for several federal agencies). 
40 463 U.S. 582 (1983). 
41 See id. at 584 n.2. 
42 469 U.S. 287 (1985). 
43 Id. at 293. 
44 See Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28, §§ 2(2),6 
(1988) (codified at 20 U.S.c. * 1687(2)(A), 42 U.S.c. § 2000d-4a (1994» (overruling Grove 
City College V. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984». 
45' See Mank, Title VI, supra note 4, at 25-26; Julia B. Worsham, Disparate Impact Law-
suits Under Title VI, Section 602: Can a Legal Tool Build Environmental iustice?, 27 B.C: 
ENVfL. AFF. L. REV. 631, 644 (2000). But see Michael D. Mattheisen, Applying The Dispa-
rate Impact Rule of Law to Environmental Permitting Under Title VI of The Civil Rights Act 
of 1964,24 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'y REV. 1, 29-33 (2000) (arguing permitting 
actions by state environmental agencies generally do not constitute state agency action 
because permit applicant typically chooses location of site). 
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gation Guidance clearly assumes that the agency's Title VI regula-
tions apply to state permitting decisions.41i 
First promulgated in 1973 and then revised in 1984, the EPA's 
Title VI regulations prohibit recipients of agency funding, which 
include almost all state environmental agencies, from engaging in 
actions that either intentionally discriminate or cause disparate 
impacts.47 Additionally, the EPA's Title VI regulations require 
state recipients to create a compliance scheme to prevent discrimi-
nation by both the state and any beneficiaries of state-administered 
funds.48 Furthermore, the agency's Title VI regulations define pro-
cedures for investigating possible violations by recipients.49 EPA's 
section 602 regulations forbid recipients from creating disparate 
impacts: "A recipient [of federal funds] shall not use criteria or 
methods of administration which have the effect of subjecting indi-
viduals to discrimination because of their race, color, [or] national 
origin."50 In addition, the agency's regulations proscribe recipients 
from choosing or approving a facility in an area where the plant 
will create discriminatory impacts that harm minority or ethnic 
groups covered by the statute.51 The Administrator of EPA has 
authority under the regulations to refuse, delay, or discontinue 
agency funding to any specific program or subprogram in which the 
agency has found unjustified discrimination, but the agency gener-
ally prefers to use settlement agreements with recipients to change 
. practices that are arguably discriminatory.52 The Revised Investi-
46 Guidance, supra note 5, at 39,650-54 passim. Later guidance will address other issues, 
including allegedly disproportionate enforcement by state agencies. Id. at 39,650-51. 
47 •• A redpient [of federal funds] shall not use criteria or methods of administration 
which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race, 
color, [or] national origin." 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b) (1984). See generally 38 Fed. Reg. 17,968 
(1973), amended by 49 Fed. Reg. 1656 (1984) (codified at 40 C.F.R. part 7); Mank, Private 
Calise of Action, supra note 4, at 17; Mank, Title VI, supra note 4, at 25-26. 
48 See 28 C.F.R. § 42.410 (1984); Mank, Private Cause of Action, supra note 4, at 17; 
Mank, Title VI, supra note 4, at 26. 
49 See 40 C.F.R. § 7 (1985); James H. Colopy, Note, The Road Less Traveled: Pursuing 
Environmental Justice Through Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 13 STAN. ENVTL. 
L.J. 125,128 (1994); Mank, Tille VI, supra note 4, at 27-29. 
50 See 49 Fed. Reg. 1661 (1984) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b) (1984» . 
. 51 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(c) (1984) (prohibiting location of facility that has discriminatory 
effect). Several other federal agencies have similar regulations forbidding siting or permit-
ting actions by recipient agencies that cause disparate impact. See, e.g., Nuclear Regula-
tory Commission, 10 C.F.R. § 4.12(c) (2000); Department of Energy, 10 C.F.R. 
§ 1040.13(d) (2000); Department of Defense, 32 C.F.R. § 195.4(b)(1)(iii) (2000); Secretary 
of Transportation, 49 C.F.R. § 21.5(b)(3) (2000); and Federal Highway Administration, 23 
C.F.R. § 200.5(f) (2000). 
52 See 40 C.F.R. §§ 7.130(b)(3)(JJi)(4) (1984); 42 U.S.c. §§ 2000d, d-1 (1994); Luke W. 
C?le,. Civil Rights, Environmental Justice and the EPA: A Brief History of Administrative 
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gation Guidance encourages recipients to propose voluntary com-
pliance agreements to redress any possible discrimination issuesY 
In 1973, the Agency first issued Title VI regulations prohibiting 
recipients from engaging in actions that cause disparate impacts,54 
and then in 1984 promulgated slightly revised regulations that took 
the same approach.55 The EPA, however, did not actively enforce 
its Title VI regulations until 1993 because the agency was reluctant 
to rescind funding that state and local environmental agencies 
could use to reduce pollution.56 In 1993, President Clinton 
appointed Carol Browner as Administrator of the EPA, and she 
directed the agency to begin actively enforcing its Title VI 
regulations.57 
On February 11, 1994, President Clinton issued Executive Order 
12898, which requires all federal agencies to promote environmen-
tal justice "[t]o the greatest extent practicable and permitted by 
law."58 While the Executive Order does not directly address Title 
VI, President Clinton simultaneously issued a Presidential Memo-
randum in conjunction with the Order that requires federal agen-
cies "providing funding to programs affecting human health or the 
environment [to] ensure that their grant recipients comply with 
Complaints Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of /964,9 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 309, 317-
18 (1994); Colopy, supra note 49, at 129, 155. 
53 See Guidance, supra note 5, at 39,669, 39,683; infra notes 294-99 and accompanying 
text. 
54 38 Fed. Reg. 17,968, 17,969 (July 5, 1973) (providing a recipient may not "directly or 
indirectly, utilize criteria or methods of administration which have or may have the effect 
of subjecting a person to discrimination because of race, color, or national origin."). 
55 See 49 Fed. Reg. 1661 (Apr. 26, 1984) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b» ("A recipient 
[of federal funds] shall not use criteria or methods of administration which have the effect 
of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race, color, [or] national 
origin."). 
56 See Colopy, supra note 49, at 180-88 (discussing EPA's reluctance to enforce Title VI 
before 1973); Mank, Private Cause of Action, supra note 4, at 17-18 (same); Julia B. Wor-
sham, Disparate Impact Lawsuits Under Title VI, Section 602: Can a Legal Tool Build Envi-
ronmental Justice?, 27 B.C. ENVTL. L. REV. 631, 646 (2000). 
57 See Fisher, supra note 35, at 314-15; Mank, Private Calise of Action, supra note 4, at 
18; Worsham, supra note 56, at 647. 
58 Exec. Order No. 12,898,3 C.F.R. § 859 (1995), reprinted in 42 U.S.c. § 4321 (1982). 
See generally Bradford C. Mank, Executive Order 12898, ill THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
JUSTICE 103 (Michael Gerrard ed., 1999). The Order does not authorize suits by private 
citizens to enforce its provisions against federal agencies. Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. 
Reg. 7629 (1994), at § 6-609. However, the EPA's administrative law judges have required 
the agency to comply with its terms when complainants file internal administrative chal-
lenges. In re Chemical Waste Management, Inc., 6 E.A.D. 66, 1995 WL 395962 (EPA June 
29, 1995) (holding EPA as a matter of policy should exercise its discretion under RCRA's 
omnibus clause to address environmental justice issues). 
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Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."59 Accordingly, the mem-
orandum encourages federal agencies to enforce their Title VI reg-
ulations. It was no coincidence that in 1994, after President 
Clinton issued Executive Order 12,898 and the accompanying 
memorandum, the EPA created an Office of Civil Rights (the 
"OCR") to handle Title VI investigations.60 
Any person who is allegedly adversely affected by the actions of 
a funding recipient may file a Title VI complaint with the OCR, 
which will determine if the complaint is within the Agency's juris-
diction and begin an investigation if appropriate.61 Unfortunately, 
because of both staff shortages and substantial uncertainties about 
how to apply its Title VI regulations, the OCR has had serious 
problems resolving complaints in a timely fashion.62 As of Novem-
ber 30, 2000, the EPA had received 108 Title VI complaints.63 The 
Agency had rejected forty-seven complaints. Forty-three were 
rejected because the Agency lacked jurisdiction for various reasons 
while four were dismissed after an agency investigation had begun. 
Only one case was dismissed on the merits after an agency investi-
gation found no evidence of adverse disparate impacts.64 By 
November 30, 2000, the EPA had a backlog of sixty-one pending 
complaints.65 Of these, forty were under review for possible inves-
tigation and twenty-one had been accepted for investigation.66 
Several pending accepted cases were filed in 1993 or 1994 even 
5Y Mank, Executive Order 12898, supra note 58, at 107, summarizing Presidential Memo· 
randum Accompanying Executive Order 12898, 30 WKLY. COMPo PRES. Doc. 279, 280 
(Feb. 11, 1994). 
60 See generally Mank, Executive Order 12898, supra note 58. at 107-09 (discussing 
efforts by President Clinton and EPA Administrator Carol Browner to expand EPA's envi-
ronmental justice programs). 
61 See Mank, Draft Guidance, supra note 5, at 11 ,147-48, 11,157-61 (discussing EPA's 
criteria for accepting a complaint); Mank, Private Cause of Action, supra note 4. at 20-23. 
62 See Mank, Draft Guidance, supra note 5, at 11,147-48; Worsham, supra note 56, at 
647-48. . 
63 See Status Summary Table of EPA Administrative Complaints, http//:www.epa.gov. 
ocrpage1/docs/t6stNov2000.pdf (Nov. 30,2000) (updated version available at http://www. 
epa.gov/civilrights/docs/t6staug20d.pdf (Aug. 10, 2001 ». 
64 See Letter from Ann E. Goode, Director, EPA's Office of Civil Rights, RE: EPA File 
No. 5R-98-R5 (Select Steel Complaint) to St. Francis Prayer Center [Complainant} and 
Michigan Department of Environmental Quality [Recipient} http://www.epa.gov/ocrpage1/ 
recdecsn.htm. (Oct. 30,2001) (dismissing Title VI complaint against Michigan Department 
of Environmental Quality). See also Luke W. Cole, Wrong on the Facts, Wrong on the 
Law: Civil Rights Advocates Excoriate EPA's Most Recent Title VI Misstep, 29 ENVTL. L. 
REP. 10,775 (Dec. 1999) (criticizing EPA's dismissal of Select Steel complaint). 
65 See Status Summary Table of EPA Administrative Complaints, supra note 63. See gen-
erally 40 C.F.R. § 7.115(c)(1) (1999) (stating EPA will issue preliminary findings within 180 
days from start of complaint). 
66 See Status Summary Table of EPA Administrative Complaints, supra note 63. 
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though the Agency's regulations normally require the Agency to 
issue preliminary findings within 180 days from the start of an 
investigation.67 Since 1998, the Agency has doubled its staff 
resources and contract dollars to reduce this backlog.68 
Complainants have very limited rights to either internal agency 
or judicial review under either Title VI or the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act if the EPA decides to dismiss an administrative com-
plaint for lack of evidence.69 However, some courts have 
recognized that citizens have a private right of action under Section 
602 of Title VI to enforce the EPA's regulations even if they do not 
exhaust their administrative remedies with the Agency.7o The 
Supreme Court has granted certiorari to decide whether there is a 
private right of action under Section 602.71 Whatever the decision 
of the Supreme Court as far as private rights of action, an affected 
individual could file a complaint with the EPA. 
B. The EPA's Title VI Guidance 
In February 1998, the EPA issued an "Interim Guidance for 
Investigating Title VI Administrative Complaints Challenging Per-
mits" to help the Agency's Office of Civil Rights evaluate Title VI 
complaints.72 The Interim Guidance addressed the procedural pro-
cess for filing complaints and set forth a five-step process for 
67 See Title VI Complaints Filed with United States Environmental Protection Agency, 
http//:www.epa.gov/civilrights/t6complnt.htm. 
68 U.S. EPA, Office of Civil Rights, Guidance Document: Questions and Answers, http:/ 
/www.epa.gov/ocrpage1/t6guidefaq2.pdf (discussing June 2000 Draft Guidance on Title VI) 
[hereinafter Guidance Document: Questions and Answers], at 6 (Question 20). 
69 See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 715 (1979) (suggesting that Title 
VI generally does not allow private suits against the federal government); Mank, Private 
Cause of Action, supra note 4, at 22 (stating that complainants have very limited appeals 
rights under either Title VI or the Administrative Procedure Act); Mank, Title VI, supra 
note 4, at 29; Colopy, supra note 49, at 168-71. 
70 See generally Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d 484 (11 th Cir. 1999) (holding private right 
of action under disparate impact regulations issued pursuant to Section 602 of Title VI), 
cert. granted, Alexander v. Sandoval, 121 S. Ct. 28 (U.S. Sept. 26, 2000); Powell v. Ridge, 
189 F.3d 387 (3d Cir. 1999) (same), cert. denied, No. 99-574, 68 USLW 3252, 1999 WL 
812341 (U.S. Dec. 6, 1999); Mank, Private Cause of Action, supra note 4; Guidance, supra 
note 5, at 39,671 n.77 (raising issue of private right of action). 
71 See Sandoval, 197 F.3d 484. 
72 See EPA, Interim Guidance for Investigating Title VI Administrative Complaints 
Challenging Permits (Feb. 1998) [hereinafter Interim Guidance]; Cheryl Hogue, EPA 
Issues Guidance for Investigating Claims that State, Local Permits .Are Discriminatory, 66 
U.S. L. WK. (Legal News) 2504 (Feb. 24, 1998) [hereinafter Hogue, EPA Issues Guidance]; 
Mank, Title VI, supra note 4, at 38-43. 
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assessing whether a decision causes disparate impacts.73 However, 
a wide range of groups criticized the Interim Guidance for using 
vague definitions, failing to elucidate the crucial term "adverse dis-
parate impact," and not suggesting how recipients might avoid 
Title VI complaints.74 Additionally, the Interim Guidance pro-
vided that a recipient might be able to justify disparate impacts by 
either mitigating them or showing that the benefits of the project 
outweighed any harms to protected groups, but failed to ade-
quately explain when mitigative measures or economic benefits 
would be sufficient, or when a recipient is required to consider a 
less discriminatory alternative proposal,75 Because of the hostile 
reaction of industry representatives, state officials, and mayors, 
Republicans in Congress have attached riders to the last three 
EPA-appropriation bills that prohibit the Agency from conducting 
investigations using the Interim Guidance for complaints received 
since the date of the initial bill, October 21, 1998, until the Agency 
issues a final Title VI policy.76 The legislation does not affect com-
73 The Agency set forth a five-step process for evaluating whether a recipient'S approval 
or renewal of a permit will create disparate impacts: (1) identifying the affected -popula-
tion, especially those in close proximity to the facility; (2) determining the demographics of 
the affected population through mapping technology such as geographic information sys-
tems; (3) determining the universe(s) of facilities and total affected population(s), espe-
cially the cumulative pollution burden of neighboring facilities; (4) conducting a disparate 
impact analysis by both examining the racial or ethnic composition within the affected 
population and by comparing that composition to non-affected populations in other rele-
vant areas; and (5) determining the significance of the disparity through the use of stan-
dard statistical methods. See Interim Guidance, supra note 72, at 9-12; Mank, Title VI, 
supra note 4, at 40-45; Bradford C. Mank, Environmental Justice (lnd Title VI: Making 
Recipient Agencies Justify Their Siting Decisions, 73 TuL. L. REV. 787, 795-98 (1999) [here-
·inafter Mank, Recipient Agencies]. 
74 On June 27, 2000, the Agency published in the Federal Register~ along with the draft 
guidance, a Summary of Key Stakeholder Issues Concerning EPA Title VI Guidance that 
summarizes and responds to over 120 written comments the Agency received about the 
Interim Guidance. See generally Guidance, supra note 5, at 39,688-758. 
75 See Interim Guidance, supra note 72, at 11-12 (discussing mitigation and justification 
of disparate impacts). See generally Mank, Recipieilf Agencies, supra note 73, at 814-34 
(criticizing Interim Guidance's discussion of mitigation, justification, or less discriminatory 
alternatives ). 
76 Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development and Indepen-
dent Agencies Appropriations Act 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-377 (HR 4635), 114 Stat. 1441, 
144IA-41 ("That none of the funds made available in this Act may be used to implement 
or administer the interim guidance issued on February 5, 1998, by the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency relating to title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ... with respect to 
complaints filed under such title after October 21, 1998, and until guidance is finalized."); 
Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development and Independent 
Agencies Appropriations Act 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-276 (H.R. 4194), 112 Stat. 2461 (1998); 
Guidance Document: Questions and Answers, supra note 68, at 6. 
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plaints that had already been accepted for investigation prior to 
that date.77 
On June 27, 2000, the EPA published two draft guidances on 
Title VI in the Federal Register.78 The Recipient Guidance, pre-
pared at the request of state and local officials seeking to avoid 
complaints and violations, discusses a range of possible approaches 
to minimize the likelihood that a complaint will be filed against a 
recipient.79 In particular, the Recipient Guidance encourages 
recipients to collect data about minority populations and pollution 
levels to identify areas where there may be .significant disparate 
impacts and to eliminate such impacts so that there is no need for 
minority communities or individuals to file a Title VI complaint. 
The Revised Investigation Guidance clarifies how the Agency 
will process complaints, conduct its investigations, determine 
whether a permit decision creates unacceptable adverse impacts, 
and weigh efforts by the recipient to reduce or eliminate adverse 
disparate impacts.8o. By providing more detailed standards and 
procedures than the Interim Guidance, the Revised Investigation 
Guidance attempts to give recipients a better idea of both what 
they should not do and what they should do.8l However, while the 
Revised Investigation Guidance provides more clarity than the 
Interim Guidance, a wide range of critics argue that the EPA must 
provide more precise definitions and firm standards applicable in 
every case.82 
C. Defining an Appropriate Comparison Population 
In Step Four of the Interim Guidance, the EPA stated that it 
would conduct a disparate impact analysis by both examining the 
racial or ethnic composition within the affected population and by 
comparing that composition to non-affected populations in other 
relevant areas.83 No further explanation was provided. By con-
trast, the Revised Investigation Guidance provides a more detailed 
explanation of how the EPA will conduct a disparity analysis and 
select a comparison population than the Interim Guidance, but, 
77 See Mank, Recipient Agencies, supra note 73, at 810. 
78 See Guidance, supra note 5; Mank, Draft Guidance, supra note 5, at 11,147. 
79 See Guidance, supra note 5, at 39,651-52, 39,655; Mank, Draft Guidance, supra note 5. 
80 See Guidance, supra note 5, at 39,651-54. The Guidance addresses only permitting 
decisions. Later guidance will address other issues, including allegedly disproportionate 
enforcement. [d. at 39,650-51. 
81 See Guidance, supra note 5, at 39,669; Mank, Draft Guidance, supra note 5, at 11,150. 
82 See Mank, Draft Guidance, supra note 5, at 11,145-46, 11,173. 
83 Interim Guidance, supra note 72, at 9-12. 
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despite its greater length, does not fully address many important 
issues. 
1. The Affected Population 
While a complaint may roughly identify the population group 
that is allegedly adversely harmed by the recipient's actions, the 
Revised Investigation Guidance states that the EPA will have the 
final say in defining the "affected population."1'!4 First, the EPA 
will identify the affected popUlation by determining which popula-
tion( s) are likely to be disproportionately affected by significant 
adverse impacts above established statutory or regulatory thresh-
olds, particularly those nearest to facilities or exposure pathways 
creating such impacts.x5 Assessing the degree of such impacts is 
difficult because each group may experience separate and unique 
harms from different pollutants or exposure pathways.x6 Addition-
ally, estimating the dimensions of the affected populations is often 
difficult because exposure pathways may be irregularly shaped in 
light of prevailing wind· direction, stream direction, or topogra-
phy.87 Consequently, depending upon the location of a plume or 
pathway of impact, the affected population does not necessarily 
include those people who live closest to a source.88 
The OCR will use mathematical models based on monitoring 
data, when possible, to estimate the location and size of the 
affected populations because an area of adverse impacts may be 
irregularly shaped as a result of environmental factors or other 
conditions such as wind direction, stream direction, or topogra-
phy.8,) Even though the Agency will use quantitative models where 
possible to identify the most affected population, the Revised 
Investigation Guidance acknowledges that limitations in available 
information will often force the OCR to use simpler radial models 
based primarily on proximity to the environmental medium and 
impacts of concern in that caseYo As discussed below in Section 
84 See Guidance, supra note 5, at 39.681-82; Mank, Draft Guidance, supra note 5, at 
11,168. 
85 See Guidance, sllpra note 5, at 39,681; Mank, Draft Guidance, supra note 5, at 11,168. 
86 See Guidance, supra note 5, at 39,681 n.132; Mank, Draft Guidance, supra note 5, at 
11,168. 
87 See Guidance, supra note 5, at 39,681; Mank, Draft Guidance, sllpra note 5, at 11,168. 
88 See Mank, Draft Guidance, supra note 5, at 11,168. 
89 /d. 
90 Id. 
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VI, there is controversy about the comparative advantages and dis-
advantages of quantitative, radial, and proximity modelsYI 
In addition, after defining the physical location of the most 
affected geographic areas, the Agency will use standard demo-
graphic analysis methods, such as geographic information systems, 
to estimate the racial demographics of populations within a certain 
proximity from a facility.92 If it uses pre-ordained units of mea-
surement, the EPA will use the smallest geographic area possible 
for the demographic data, such as census blocks, when conducting 
disparity assessmentsY3 
A number of environmental justice advocates have criticized the 
Revised Investigation Guidance for adopting a restrictive approach 
in defining the "affected community" by preferring scientific moni-
toring data and computer modeling to determine the "affected 
communities" within a facility's exposure pathway; although the 
EPA in some circumstances uses a less restrictive proximity analy-
sis if more thorough statistical evidence is unavaiiableY4 These 
advocates argue that such data is often unavailable, especially in 
poor and minority areas. They do not want the EPA to dismiss a 
complaint simply because quantitative data is unavailableYs Con-
versely, industry and state officials generally prefer scientifically 
reliable evidence and caution that the EPA should be careful about 
finding discrimination based on simplistic models, such as mere 
proximity to a proposed site, because distance does not establish 
whether significant harm exists.96 
2. Comparison Populations 
After identifying the affected population, the OCR will analyze 
whether a disparity exists between the affected population and an 
appropriate comparison population in terms of race, color, or 
national origin and adverse impact.97 The Revised Investigation 
Guidance states that the EPA would probably find a significant 
91 See Fisher, supra note 35, at 322; Worsham, supra note 56, at 690. 
92 See Guidance, supra note 5, at 39,681; Mank, Draft Guidance, supra note 5, at 11,168. 
93 See Guidance, supra note 5, at 39,681; Mank, Draft Guidance. supra note 5 at 11, 168. 
94 See Guidance, supra note 5, at 39,679-81; Mank, Draft Guidance, supra note 5, at 
11,166. 
95 See Guidance, supra note 5, at 39,679-81; Mank, Draft Guidance. supra note 5, at 
11,166. 
96 See Guidance, supra note 5, at 39, 679-81; Mank, Draft Guidance, supra note 5, at 
11,166. 
97 See Guidance, supra note 5, at 39,654, 39,681-82; Mank, Draft Guidance, supra note 5, 
at 11,168-69. 
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adverse disparate impact under Title VI if reliable tests of both 
demographic disparity and disparities in the amount of impact are 
statistically significant to a factor of at least two to three standard 
deviations higher in the affected population than an appropriate 
comparison population.')!; However, the Agency has broad discre-
tion to weigh other factors, such as the severity of the impact or the 
extent of the demographic disparityYlJ 
In determining the comparison population, the EPA will evalu-
ate the allegations and facts in each case. 100 Accordingly, the 
Agency has considerable discretion in each case to decide what the 
comparison population should be .. The Revised Investigation Gui-
dance does provide some direction by stating that the EPA will 
usually define a relevant comparison populations from those who 
live within a "reference area" defined by the recipient's jurisdic-
tion. lOl The reference area will normally fall into one of the follow-
ing three categories: (1) a "reference area" such as the recipient's 
jurisdiction, which may range from an air district to an entire state; 
(2) a political jurisdiction such as a town, county, or state; or (3) an 
area defined by environmental criteria, such as an airshed or water-
shed. l02 Furthermore, the OCR will usually select comparison 
populations that are larger than the affected population. For 
instance, if a complaint alleges that Asian Americans throughout a 
state bear adverse disparate impacts from permitted sources of 
water pollution, then the Agency would probably select the entire 
state as the appropriate reference area. 103 
Moreover, the EPA has broad discretion to include either the 
general population of the reference area or only the non-affected 
portion of the reference area as the comparison population, includ-
ing the general population of a state. I04 Hence, the EPA in its dis-
cretion could compare the affected population with either the total 
general population in the Agency's jurisdiction, including the 
9X See Guidance, supra note 5, at 39,661, 39,681-82; Mank, Draft Guidance, supra note 5, 
at ·11,169-70. 
99 "For instance where a large disparity (e.g., a factor of 10 times higher) exists with 
regard to a significant adverse impact, OCR might find disparate impact even though the 
demographic disparity is relatively slight (e.g., under 20% )." Guidance, supra note 5, at 
39,682; Mank, Draft Guidance, supra note 5, at 11,169-70. 
100 See Guidance, supra note 5, at 39,661, 39,681-82; Mank, Draft Guidance, supra note 
5, at 11,168-69. 
lOl Guidance, supra note 5, at 39,665, 39,681; Mank, Draft Guidance, supra note 5, at 
11,169. 
102 See Guidance, supra note 5, at 39,681; Mank, Draft Guidance, supra note 5, at 11 ,169. 
103 See Guidance, supra note 5, at 39,681; Mank, Draft Guidance, supra note 5, at 11,169. 
104 See Guidance, supra note 5 at 39,681; Mank, Draft Guidance, supra note 5, at 11,169. 
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affected group, or with only the non-affected population within the 
general population of the Agency's jurisdiction, excluding the 
affected group from the comparison population. 105 These choices 
are important because the Agency is more likely to find a disparity 
if the comparison population has a relatively low number of minor-
ities than if their proportion is relatively high.lo6 The EPA in the 
Revised Investigation Guidance recognized that there is great vari-
ability in the proportion of racial subgroups in each state, from 4 % 
to 50% of different states' populations, and that these differences 
would affect the outcome of its adverse disparity analyses unless 
the Agency compensated for them.107 
Moreover, the Agency may evaluate whether there is a disparity 
by using comparisons both of the different prevalence of race, 
color, or national origin in the two populations, a!1d of the level of 
risk of adverse impacts experienced by each population. 108 The 
Agency will generally apply at least one and usually more of the 
following comparisons of demographic characteristics: (1) the 
demographic characteristics of an affected population in relation-
ship to the demographic characteristics of a non-affected popula-
tion or the general population; 109 (2) the demographic 
characteristics of those most likely affected, for example, the high-
est 5% of risk, to those least likely affected, such as the lowest 
5% 110; or (3) the probability of different demographic groups such 
as African Americans, Hispanics, or Whites in a surrounding juris-
IO~ Mank, Draft Guidance, supra note 5, at 11,169. 
106 See Michael W. Steinberg, Making Sense of Environmental Justice, 15 F. FOR 
ApPLIED RES. & PUB. POL'y 82, 84-85 (2000). 
107 For example, in a state with a minority population of four percent, using a factor of 
two test would result in the EPA finding a disparity if the minority population in an 
affected area was at least eight percent. By contrast, in a state with a minority population 
of fifty percent, using a factor of two test would result in the EPA finding a disparity only if 
the minority population in an affected area was one hundred percent-the entire popula-
tion! See Guidance, supra note 5, at 39,682 n.138; Mank, Draft Guidance, supra note 5, at 
11,170. 
108 See Guidance, supra note 5, at 39,681; Mank, Draft Guidance, supra note 5, at 11,169. 
109 See Guidance, supra note 5, at 39,681 n.134 (citing Draft Revised Demographic Infor-
mation, Title VI Administrative Complaint re: Louisiana Department of Environmental 
Quality/Permit for Proposed Shin tech Facility, Apr. 1998, Facility Distribution Charts DI 
through D40 http://www.epa.gov/civilrights/shinfileapr98.htm. files t-d01-1O.pdf, t-d11-
120.pdf, t-d21-30.pdf, t-d31-40.pdf. [hereinafter Shintech Demographic Information]); 
Mank, Draft Guidance, supra note 5, at 11,169. 
110 These values approximate the outlying portions (sometimes called the "tails") of a 
distribution of risk that are beyond two standard deviations of the mean value. See Gui-
dance, Sllpra note 5, at 39,681-82 n.l35; Mank, Draft Guidance, supra note 5, at 11,169. 
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diction being in an affected population or a highly affected 
subpopulation. III 
The OCR also expects to compare the level of risk of potential 
adverse impacts between the affected population and comparison 
population by evaluating either: (1) the average risk of adverse 
impacts by demographic groups within the general population or 
within an affected population;112 or (2) the range of risk of adverse 
impacts by demographic groups within the general population or 
within an affected population. I 13 
A wide range of critics has argued the Guidance does not ade-
quately define such terms as "affected population" and "an appro-
priate comparison population.""4 This article will focus on the 
problem that the EPA's broad discretion to include either the gen-
eral population of the reference area or only the non-affected por-
tion of the reference area as the comparison population, including 
the general population of a state, may in some circumstances fail to 
address the principle in many Title VII cases that a comparison 
population must be "similarly situated" to the affected 
population. 115 
III. PROVING DISPARATE IMPACT DISCRIMINATION UNDER 
TITLES VI AND VII 
A. The Basics of Proving Disparate Impact Discrimination 
There is a fundamental distinction between discrimination cases 
alleging disparate treatment in which a plaintiff must prove inten-
tional discrimination, and those alleging that facially neutral poli-
cies cause significant and unjustified disparate impacts. An intent 
claim alleges that similarly situated persons are treated differently 
because of their race, color, or national origin, and that "a chal-
III See Guidance, supra note 5, at 39,682 n.136 (citing Shintech Demographic Informa-
tion, the last.column in Tables Al through 87, supra note 109, at http://www.epa.gov/civil 
rights/shinfileapr98.htm. table-al.pdf through table-b.7.pdf.); Mank, Draft Guidance, supra 
note 5, at 11,169. 
112 See Guidance, supra note 5, at 39,682 n.137 (citing Shin tech Demographic Informa-
tion, last column in Tables C I through C5, supra note 109, at http://www.epa.gov/civil 
rights/shinfileapr98.htm, table-cl.pdf through table-c5.pdf.); Mank, Draft Guidance, supra 
note 5, at 11,169. 
113 See Guidance, supra note 5, at 39,682; Mank, Draft Guidance, supra note 5, at 11,169. 
114 See API, supra note 17, at 11; Environmental Council of States (ECOS), Comments 
on Environmental Justice Guidance 4 (as approved by the Cross Media Committee on Aug. 
14, 2000) http://www.epa.gov/ocrpagelldocs/t6com2000_043.pdf; Mank, Draft Guidance, 
supra note 5, at 11,169. 
115 See infra notes 197-200, 206-07. 
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lenged action was motivated by an intent to discriminate.""6 In 
disparate treatment cases, plaintiffs are often unable to present 
direct proof of discriminatory motive. Instead, plaintiffs usually 
present either direct or circumstantial evidence suggesting that the 
defendant intended to discriminate and from such evidence a trier 
of fact may infer intentional discrimination. 117 Statistical evidence 
by itself usually cannot conclusively prove whether a defendant 
engaged in intentional discrimination, but statistical evidence is 
sometimes strong enough for a trier of fact to draw an inference of 
intentional discrimination. llB Under the shifting burden frame-
work established by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green, 119 a plaintiff alleging disparate treatment in either a 
Title VI or VII case may establish a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion by alleging that she was denied a job or benefit for which she 
was qualified, and then shift the burden to the recipient or 
employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for 
its action.120 
In a Title VI disparate impacts case, a plaintiff alleges that aneu-
tral procedure or practice used by a recipient causes significant and 
unjustified disparate effects on individuals of a particular race, 
color, or national origin. 12l If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie 
case of discrimination, the investigating agency must determine 
whether the recipient can articulate a "substantial legitimate justifi-
116 Elston v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1406 (11th CiT. 1993); TITLE 
VI LEGAL MANUAL, supra note 3, at.27. 
117 See Tex. Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255-56 (1981) (dis-
cussing an individual disparate impact case); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 
792, 802 (1973) (discussing an individual disparate impact case); Ramona L. Paetzold & 
Steven L. Willborn, The Statistics of Discrimination: Using Statistical Evidence in Discrimi-
nation Claims, *§ 1.03, 1.08-09, 4.03, 4.08 (1994 & 1998 Updates); Todd B. Adams, Envi-
rOllmental Justice and the Limits of Disparate Impact Analysis, 16 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 
417,421 n.37, 427 n.63 (1999). 
118 See Adams, supra note 117, at 421 n.37,426. 
119 McDonllell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 792. 
120 See Baldwin v. Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch, 945 F. Supp. 1022, 1031 (S.D. Tex. 1996) 
(discussing Title VI disparate treatment case); Brantley v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 625, 936 F. 
Supp. 649,658 n.17 (D. Minn. 1996) (same); TITLE VI LEGAL MANUAL, supra note 3, at 27. 
Blit see Godby v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 996 F. Supp. 1390, 1414 n.17 (M.D. 
Ala. 1998) (declining to apply McDollnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to Title VI 
claim). 
121 See Villanueva v. Carere, 85 F.3d 481,486 (10th CiT. 1996); N.Y. Urban League v. 
New York, 71 F.3d 1031, 1036 (2d CiT. 1995); City of Chicago v. Lindley, 66 F.3d 819, 828-
29 (7th CIT. 1995); Elston v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d at 1406-07; Larry P. v. 
Riles, 793 F.2d 969, 982 n.9 (9th CiT. 1984). 
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cation" for the practice. 122 This article will focus on disparate 
impact discrimination. 
In Title VI cases, judges have often looked to Title VII employ-
ment discrimination decisions for assistance in addressing various 
substantive and procedural questions, although some care must be 
taken in comparing these two civil rights statutes. 123 Both Title VI 
and Title VII cases have applied a tripartite structure in which: (1) 
the plaintiff must prove a prima facie case of disparate impacts; (2) 
if the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of adverse disparate 
impacts, the defendant may offer a legitimate justification for it~ 
actions such as cost, safety or the use of appropriate technical crite-
ria; and (3) if the defendant offers an apparently legitimate justifi-
cation, a plaintiff then has the ultimate burden of proof in 
establishing that the defendant's justification is actually a pretext 
or that the defendant has refused to use an alternative practice or 
location with less discriminatory harm.124 This article will focus on 
the plaintiff's initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of 
discrimination by showing that a facially neutral practice causes 
disproportionate effects to an affected population when compared 
to an appropriate comparison population. 
B. A Prima Facie Case of Discrimination 
To establish a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimina-
tion, a Title VI plaintiff must demonstrate by a preponderance of 
the evidence that a recipient agency has engaged in a specific prac-
tice that causes an unjustified disproportionate impact on persons 
protected by the statute. 125 To establish a prima facie case, a plain-
tiff must first present evidence that a specific group of minorities 
are disproportionately included or excluded compared to a rele-
122 See Ga. State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1417 
(11 th Cir. 1985). 
123 See N. Y. Urban League, 71 F.3d at 1036; Ga. State Conference of Branches of 
NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d at 1417; Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d at 982 n.9; Mank, Recipi-
ent Agencies, supra note 73, at 798-99; Mank, Title VI, supra note 4, at 37-38; Sidney D. 
Watson, Reinvigorating Title VI: Defending Health Care Discrimination-It Shouldn't Be 
So Easy, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 939, 971-73 (1990). 
124 See N. Y. Urban League, 71 F.3d at 1036-39; Elston v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 
997,F.2d 1394,1406-07 (11 th Cir. 1993); Young v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 922 F. 
Supp. at 544-51; Mank, Recipient Agencies, supra note 73, at 799-809; Mank, Title VI, supra 
note 4, at 38-40. 
125 See Mank, Recipient Agencies, supra note 73, at 799-800. See also EEOC v. Steam-
ship Clerks Union, Local 1066, 48 F.3d 594, 601 (1st Cir. 1995) (discussing standard for 
prima facie case under Title VII). 
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'vant comparison group and then persuade a court to infer that the 
recipient's practices caused those disproportionate impacts. 126 
During the 1970s, courts in Title VII cases often allowed a plain-
tiff to establish a prima facie case· of discrimination by comparing 
an affected population to the general population in deciding 
whether disproportionate impacts were present. More recently, 
courts have· required a plaintiff seeking to establish a prima facie 
case to show it has chosen an appropriate comparison group that is 
"similarly situated" to the allegedly affected population.127 For 
instance, a Title VII plaintiff in an employment case normally com-
pares the racial characteristics of successful job applicants with the 
pool of qualified job applicants. 128 In Title VII employment dis-
crimination cases, courts have frequently rejected a plaintiff's sta-
tistical evidence if either the "affected" minority population or the 
comparison groups selected are under- or over-incIusive. 129 As dis-
cussed below in Section V, a Title VI plaintiff must also establish 
that a comparison group is similarly situated with the allegedly 
affected population. 
126 See, e.g., New York City Envtl. Justice Alliance v. Giuliani, 214 F.3d 65, 69-72 (2d 
Cir. 2000) (stating "[t]he plaintiffs did not, in our view, submit adequate proof of causation 
to show a likelihood of success on the merits of their disparate impact claim."): Elston, 997 
F.2d at 1406-07 (discussing standard under Title VI for proving causation); Peter E. Maho-
ney, The End(s) of Disparate Impact: Doctrinal Reconstruction, Fair Housing and Lending 
Law, alld the Antidiscrimination Principle, 47 EMORY LJ. 409, 423. 460-61 (1998); Mank, 
Recipient Agencies, supra note 73, at 799-801. In Title VII employment discrimination 
cases, a plaintiff proving a prima facie case must also identify a specific employment prac-
tice alleged to cause the disparity and prove that the practice actually caused the disparity . 
. [d. at 799-800. It is not clear to what extent the specific practice requirement applies to 
Title VI. Id. at 800. Furthermore, to establish a prima facie case, a plaintiff must prove the 
identified practice actually caused the disparate impact. See id. at 800-01. Both the specific 
practice and causation issues are beyond the scope of this article. 
127 See Coalition of Concerned Citizens Against 1-670 v. Damian, 608 F. Supp. 110, 127-
28 (S.D. Ohio 1984); Mahoney, supra note 126, at 423, 461; Mank, Recipient Agencies, 
supra note 73, at 800. 
128 See III re Employment Discrimination Litig. against the State of Ala., 198 F.3d 1305, 
1311-13 (11 th Cir. 1999): Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642, 650-51 (1989); 
Mahoney, supra note 126, at 423,461; Linda Lye, Comment, Title Vll's Tangled Tale: The 
Erosion and Confusion of Disparate Impact and the Business Necessity Defense, 19 BERKE-
LEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 315, 343 (1998) . 
129 See EEOC v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 723 F. Supp. 734 (S.D. Fla. 1989): Lye, 
supra note 128, at 343-44 & n. 148 (citing cases). 
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C. The Evolution of Disparate Impact in Title VII Cases: From 
General Population Statistics to Relevant Labor Markets 
1. . Cases Using General Population Statistics for Comparison 
Initially, during the 1970s, the Supreme Court in Title VII cases 
frequently approved a plaintiff's use of general population statistics 
as the appropriate comparison group in establishing a prima facie 
case of disparate impact discrimination. During 1971, in Griggs v. 
Duke Power CO.,130 the Supreme Court unanimously held in a case 
of first impression that facially neutral employment practices could 
violate Title VII if they have a disparate impact on minority 
groupS.131 In Griggs, African-American employees challenged a 
'policy that required employees to have a high school degree and to 
pass two general intelligence tests to be eligible for certain jobS.132 
Duke Power had imposed those requirements the same day it 
ended its overtly discriminatory policies against African-Ameri-
cans. Because African-Americans as a group possessed fewer high 
. school diplomas and passed the various standardized tests at a sig-
nificantly lower rate than did whites, these employments policies 
disproportionately limited their employment opportunities at 
Duke Power. 133 The lower courts held that these facially neutral 
requirements did not violate Title VII because "there was no show-
ing of a racial purpose or invidious intent."134 
In Griggs, the Court first held that facially neutral policies that 
have disparate impacts may violate Title VII. 135 An employer has 
"the burden of showing that any given requirement [having a dis-
parate impact] must have a manifest relationship to the employ-
ment in question."136 Duke Power failed to show that either high 
school diplomas or the standardized tests utilized were relevant to 
job performance because white employees who were hired before 
these requirements had performed satisfactorily and were pro-
moted despite the absence of these credentialsp7 Accordingly, the 
"good intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem 
employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as 
130 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
131 /d. at 431. Title VII did not explicitly mention disparate impact analysis until passage 
of the 1991 Civil Rights Restoration Act. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, codified at 42 V.S.c. 
§ 2000e-2(k)(1)(c) (West 1994); Adams, supra note 117, at 420 n.20. 
132 See Adams, supra note' 117, at 425-26. 
133 See Adams, supra note 117, at 430-32 & n.6. 
134 Adams, supra note 117, at 425-26. 
135 Adams, supra note 117, at 431-32. 
136 [d. 
137 /d. 
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'built-in headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated to mea-
suring job capability."'3H 
For the purposes of this Article, it is significant that the Griggs 
Court relied upon general population statistics introduced by the 
plaintiff about the percentage of white males and African-Ameri-
can males who had graduated from high school in North Carolina, 
and also approved the use by the plaintiff of general statistics about 
what percentage of whites and African-Americans passed a battery 
of tests that included the two intelligence tests used by the defen-
dant. l3Y Accordingly, Griggs implied that, at least in some cases, a 
plaintiff might be able to use general population statistics to estab-
lish a prima facie case. 
For the first few years after deciding Griggs, the Supreme Court 
used a relaxed standard for assessing whether a plaintiff had 
proved a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination and 
frequently approved the use of general population statistics. '40 For 
example, in Dothard v. Rawlinson the Supreme Court approved 
the plaintiff's use of national statistics on the general population to 
show that the defendant's height and weight requirements for 
prison guards disproportionately excluded women compared to 
men. 141 Citing Griggs, the Court specifically rejected the defen-
dant's argument that a plaintiff should have to show disproportion-
ate impact based on women who actually applied for the 
correctional positions, ttuough applicant flow statistics.142 The 
Court observed that actual applications might not reflect the 
"actual potential applicant pool" because otherwise qualified per-
sons might have been discouraged by the "very standards chal-
lenged as being discriminatory." 143 Similarly, in United 
Steelworkers v. Weber the Supreme Court approved the use of gen-
eral population statistics to justify a voluntary affirmative action 
plan reserving half of all job openings for African-Americans until 
138 Adams. supra note 117, at 432. 
139 Adams, supra note 117, at 430 n.6. 
140 See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977). See also Albemarle Paper Co. v. 
Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (addressing disparate impact of high school diploma and intel-
ligence test requirements). See generally Steven R. Greenberger, A Productivity Approach 
to Disparate Impact and the Civil Rights Act of 1991,72 OR. L. REV. 253, 271-77 (1993) 
(discussing Albemarle Paper Co. and Dotlzard). 
141 Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329-30 (using national general population statistics to demon-
strate disparate impact on women of height and weight requirements for prison guards); 
Adams, supra note 117, at 428-29; Lye, supra note 128, at 326. 
142 See Dothard, 433 U.S. at 330; Lye, supra note 128, at 326. 
143 Dothard, 433 U.S. at 330. 
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their percentage at a plant was commensurate with their percent-
age in the local labor market. 144 
. In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,145 the 
Supreme Court approved the plaintiff's comparison between the 
employer's work force and the general population because no spe-
cial qualifications were required for the line-driver job. 146 The 
Teamsters Court stated: 
[A]bsent explanation, it is ordinarily to be expected that 
nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in time result in a 
work force more or less representative of the racial and eth-
nic composition of the population in the community from 
which employees are hired. Evidence of longstanding and 
gross disparity between the composition of a work force and 
that of the general population ... may in a proper case con-
stitute prima facie proof of a pattern or practice of 
discrimination. 147 
Nevertheless, the Teamsters Court recognized that "evidence 
showing that the figures for the general population might not accu-
rately reflect the pool of qualified job applicants would also be 
relevant." 148 
Likewise, in Hazelwood School District v. United States,l4') the 
Supreme Court quoted with approval the Teamsters Court's view 
that general population statistics may be probative in some cases, 
espeCially where there are gross statistical disparities. 150 Yet the 
Hazelwood Court also stated: "When special qualifications are 
required to fill particular jobs, comparisons to the general popula-
tion (rather than to the smaller group of individuals who possess 
the necessary qualifications) may have little probative value."151 
Accordingly, Hazelwood rejected the government's use of a com-
parison between the percentage of African-American teachers with 
the percentage of African-American students and concluded that a 
"proper comparison was between the racial composition of Hazel-
144 See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 197 (1979) (explaining that a volun-
tary affirmative action plan reserving "50% of the openings in an in-plant craft-training 
program until the percentage of black craft-workers in the plant is commensurate with the 
percentage of blacks in the local labor force" is valid under Title VII); Adams, supra note 
117, at 429. 
145 431 U.S. 324 (1977). 
146 [d. at 337-40 & nn.17, 20. 
147 ld. at 340 n.20. 
148 [d. 
149 433 U.S. 299 (1977). 
150 ld. at 307-08 (citing Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 339, 340 n.20). 
151 /d. at 308 & n.13. 
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wood's teaching staff and the racial composition of the qualified 
public school teacher population in the relevant labor market."IS2 
By the late 1970s, the Supreme Court began to demand that 
plaintiffs use more narrowly tailored statistics to prove that a 
minority population was disproportionately affected by a facially 
neutral policy in relation to a narrow pool of qualified, likely job 
applicants or actual applicant flow data. ls3 In New York City 
Transit Authority v. Beazer,ls4 the plaintiffs challenged the New 
York Transit Authority's prohibition against hiring narcotics users, 
including those using methadone as treatment for curing heroin 
addiction.155 The District Court found a prima facie case of dis-· 
crimination based on its factual findings involving two statistics 
suggesting the rule had a disproportionate impact on minorities as 
compared to whites. First, about 81 % of the employees referred to 
the Authority's medical staff for suspected violation of its narcotics 
ban were either Hispanic or African-American. 156 Second, approx-
imately 63-65% of all persons participating in publicly-adminis-
tered methadone maintenance programs in New York City were 
either Hispanic or African-American. 157 
Beazer was the first Title VII case in which the Supreme Court 
rejected the use of general population statistics to prove a prima 
facie case. Instead, the Court demanded that the plaintiff produce 
statistical evidence regarding the pool of "qualified" applicants. 
The Beazer Court held that the statistical evidence relied upon by 
the District Court was insufficient because "it tells us nothing 
about the class of otherwise-qualified applicants and employees 
who have participated in methadone maintenance programs over a 
year-the only class improperly excluded by [the Transit Author-
ity's] policy under the District Court's analysis."'58 The Court con-
cluded that the plaintiffs' statistics were both over- and under-
inclusive. The statistics were over-inclusive because they included 
many "unqualified" persons who used illicit drugs or alcohol, or 
persons who had successfully obtained other jobs.159 On the other 
hand, they were also under-inclusive because they failed to take 
into account the racial demographics of methadone users in private 
152 [d. 
153 Lye, supra note 128, at 327. 
154 440 U.S. 568 (1979). 
155 [d. at 571-77. 
156 /d. at 584-85. 
157 /d. at 585. 
158 /d. at 586. 
159 [d. 
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programs. IOO Beazer favorably referenced the Court's 1977 deci-
sion in Teamsters for the proposition that" 'evidence showing that 
the figures for the general population might not accurately reflect 
the pool of qualified job applicants. '" 101 
In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio,102 the Court established a 
firm rule that plaintiffs presenting a statistical case of disparate 
impacts must compare the racial composition of persons holding 
at-issue jobs with the demographics of "the qualified population in 
the relevant labor market."103 Wards Cove Packing Company and 
another company operated a seasonal salmon canning business. A 
group of minority employees filed a class action alleging that the 
companies' employment practices had created a racially stratified 
workforce in which minorities were relegated almost completely to 
lower-paying, unskilled "cannery" jobs, while whites held the over-
whelming majority of higher-paying, skilled "non-cannery" posi-
tions. IM In holding that the plaintiffs had presented an acceptable 
prima facie case of disparate impacts, "the Court of Appeals relied 
solely on respondents' statistics showing a high percentage of non-
white workers in the cannery jobs and a low percentage of such 
workers in the non-cannery positions."105 
The Supreme Court reversed and held that statistical evidence 
showing a high percentage of nonwhite workers in the cannery jobs 
and a low percentage of such workers in the non-cannery positions 
did not establish a prima facie case of disparate impacts in violation 
of Title VII.loo The central flaw was the plaintiffs' comparison 
between skilled non-cannery workers and unskilled cannery work-
ers and the failure to address the crucial issue of whether qualified 
nonwhite applicants existed for the skilled, non-cannery jobs.167 
Most cannery workers were not qualified for the majority of non-
cannery jobs. loX Additionally, even a comparison based on those 
160 Id. 
161 /d. at 586 n.29 (quoting Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340 
n.20 (1977». 
162 490 U.S. 642 (1989). 
163 Id. at 650 (citations and editorial marks omitted). See also Adams, supra note 117, at 
429 n.76; Lye, supra note 128, at 334-35 (discussing Civil Rights Act of 1991). Congress 
subsequently amended Title VII to reverse part of the Wards Cove decision, but this legis-
lation did not change Ward Cove's requirement that a plaintiff use data from the relevant 
labor market. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(C) (1994). 
164 Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 647-48. 
165 /d. at 650. 
166 /d. at 650-55. 
167 Id. at 651. 
168 /d. 
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cannery workers who were qualified for the non-cannery jobs 
would be under-inclusive because "there are obviously many quali-
fied persons in the labor market for non-cannery jobs who are not 
cannery workers."169 Thus, the Court in Wards Cove emphasized 
that a plaintiff's statistical evidence for prima facie case of dispa-
rate impacts must focus on "qualified" workers in the relevant 
labor market. 170 
The W(lrds Cove Court did recognize that if such labor market 
statistics are difficult to obtain, it may be appropriate for a court to 
accept other statistical evidence presented by a plaintiff that indi-
cates the number of "'otherwise-qualified applicants'" for at-issue 
jobs. l7l Furthermore, the Wards Cove Court acknowledged that 
general population statistics in some cases could accurately reflect 
the pool of qualified job applicants, and even serve to establish a 
prima facie case. 172 
Critics of the Ward Cove approach to statistical comparisons 
argue that a focus on "qualified workers" and the "relevant labor 
market" places plaintiffs at a disadvantage because defendants can 
use their greater familiarity with labor markets to criticize any evi-
dence proffered by plaintiffs as either over-inclusive or under-
inclusiveP3 Plaintiffs frequently lack either the expertise or the 
requisite data to establish what is the relevant labor market.174 The 
pool of persons who actually apply for a position may not reflect all 
potentially qualified applicants if a defendant engages in practices 
that consciously or unconsciously discourage qualified minorities 
from applying.17s Additionally, employers often fail to keep ade-
quate records regarding the racial composition of applicants and 
employees and, as a result, it may be difficult for a plaintiff to 
prove discrimination based on applicant flow data.176 Moreover, it 
may be difficult for a plaintiff to identify either the relevant job 
169 [d. at 654. 
170 [d. at 650-55. 
171 /d. at 651. 
172 [d. at 651 n.6. 
173 See Lye, supra note 128, at 332 n.87, 343-44. 
174 See generally Lye, supra note 128, at 344 ("The Supreme Court has so refined the 
demonstration of disparity as to force plaintiffs to mount virtually impossible statistical 
showings-impossible because, in practice, plaintiffs frequently lack access to the requisite 
data, expertise, or both, and because a plaintiff's definition of the relevant labor market 
can almost always be criticized as under- and/or over-inclusive."); Greenberger, supra note 
140, at 312-15 (arguing it is "not easy" for plaintiffs to delineate pool of qualified potential 
job applicants). 
175 See Lye, supra note 128. at 344. See generally Greenberger, supra note 140, at 312-15. 
176 See Greenberger, supra note 140, at 312-13 & n.252. 
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market as a whole or in particular otherwise qualified minorities 
who fail to apply.177 In Wards Cove, the seasonal nature of the 
work and remote location of the canneries made it very difficult to 
identify the relevant labor market because most workers in, for 
example, the Pacific Northwest would not wish to work at a sea-
sonal position in the Alaska hinterlands. 171l In light of the difficul-
ties that plaintiffs face in identifying the relevant labor market, a 
number of commentators have argued that courts should apply a 
more relaxed standard for establishing a prima facie case if a plain-
tiff presents a plausible case that any pool of potential applicants is 
disproportionately affected by the defendant's employment 
practices. 179 
Despite the objections of many commentators, most lower court 
decisions read Wards Cove to require that plaintiffs precisely iden-
tify the relevant labor market or "appropriate pool" of qualified 
applicants. lllo Courts have frequently rejected statistical evidence 
proffered by a plaintiff on the grounds that is either over-inclusive 
or under-inclusive. 11l1 A plaintiff's comparison "must show that the 
177 Id. at 312-15; Lye, supra note 128, at 343. 
178 490 U.S. 642, 676 n.23 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Greenberger, supra note 140, 
at 288. 
179 See generally Greenberger, supra note 140, at 312-15; Lye, supra note 128, at 343-44. 
180 See, e.g., Alexander v. Fulton County, Ga., 207 F.3d 1303, 1327-28 (11th Cir. 2000) 
(observing general population statistics are useful for disparate treatment claims only for 
jobs with low skill levels where the applicant pool can be considered roughly coextensive 
with the general population, but that plaintiff must carefully identify relevant labor market 
for skilled positions); In reEmployment Discrimination Litig. against the State of Ala., 198 
F.3d 1305, 1311-13 (11 th Cir. 1999) (stating whether employment practice causes disparate 
impact must be assessed in light of qualified applicant pool); Peightal v. Metro. Dade 
County, 26 F.3d 1545, 1554 (11th Cir. 1994) (stating that "for positions requiring minimal 
training or for certain entry level positions, statistical comparison to the racial composition 
of the relevant population suffices, whereas positions requiring special skills necessitate a 
determination of .the number of minorities qualified to undertake the particular task"); 
Donnelly v. Rhode Island Sd. of Governors for Higher Educ., 929 F. SUpp. 583, 590 
(D.R.1. 1996) ("[Clare must be taken to be sure that the comparison is one between 'apples 
and apples' rather than one between 'apples and oranges."') (citing Wards Cove, 490 U.S. 
at 650-51), a/rd, 110 F.3d 2 (1st Cir. 1997); Mahoney, supra note 126, at 461. 
181 See Lopez v. Laborers In!'1 Union, 987 F.2d 1210,1214-15 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding 
plaintiffs' statistical evidence failed to address relevant labor pool); United States v. North 
Carolina, 914 F. SUpp. 1257, 1270-73 (E.D.N.C. 1996) (holding statistical evidence of dis-
parities in numbers of female and male correctional officers in state prisons was insuffi-
cient to establish prima facie case where government failed to establish relevant labor 
market); EEOC v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 723 F. SUpp. 734,751 (S.D. Fla. 1989) 
(rejecting Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's statistical evidence as both over-
inclusive and under-inclusive); Harding v. City of Houma, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5208, 76 
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (SNA) 1257 (E.D. La. Apr. 9, 1998) (citing Wards Cove and holding 
plaintiff "artificially diminished the qualified population of applicants"); Lye, supra note 
128, at 343-44; Mahoney, supra note 126, at 461 n.214. 
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unfavorable consequences are borne disproportionately by the 
members of the class in comparison to non-members who are simi-
larly situated."lx2 However, even under Wards Cove, courts may 
look at additional statistical data, including general population sta-
tistics, if the actual applicant pool might not accurately reflect the 
potential applicant pool because of the presence of discriminatory 
barriers that may discourage "otherwise-qualified applicants" from 
applying. ItO Nevertheless, the use of general population statistics is 
limited by the need to identify "otherwise" qualified persons in the 
relevant job market. 184 
In Title VII cases, there are often difficult factual questions in 
determining the precise geographical size or occupational scope of 
the relevant market. 1X5 For example, commuting distance may be a 
relevant factor in determining the scope of the relevant labor 
pool. lX(i Thus, even if th.e pool is limited to qualified workers 
rather than the general population, there are often difficult factual 
issues about which qualified workers are reasonably likely to apply 
for work at a particular company. 187 As discussed below, defining· 
an appropriate comparison group is often even more difficult in 
environmental siting cases. 
IV. THE REVISED INVESTIGATION GUIDANCE FAILS TO 
REQUIRE THAT COMPARISON POPULATIONS ARE 
SIMILARLY SITUATED 
The Revised Investigation Guidance's approach to comparison 
populations raises serious questions under Title VI because the 
EPA does not require that a comparison population must be simi-
larly situated with the affected population. The Agency cannot 
182 Donnelly v. Rhode Island Bd. of Governors for Higher Educ., 929 F. SUpp. at 590 
(citi~g EEOC v. Steamship Clerks Union, Local 1066; 48 F.3d 594, 601 (1st Cir. 1995)); see 
also Mahoney, supra note 126, at 46l. 
183 See EEOC v. Joint Apprenticeship Comm., 186 F.3d 110, 119 (2d. Cir. 1999) 
(allowing use of general popUlation statistics to establish prima facie case where there was 
evidence that actual applicant pool did not reflect potential applicant pool of otherwise 
qualified workers because of discriminatory barriers that discouraged applications by 
Blacks and women). 
184 See, e.g., In re Employment Discrimination Litig. against the State of Ala., 198 F.3d 
at 1311-13 (stating plaintiff must identify pool of otherwise qualified candidates). 
185 See EEOC v. 0 & G Spring and Wire Forms Specialty Co., 38 F.3d 872, 877-78 (7th 
Cir. 1994). 
186 See EEOC v. Chicago Miniature Lamp Works, 947 F.2d 292, 295, 298, 300, 302-05 
(7th Cir. 1991). 
187 See EEOC v. 0 & G Spring and Wire Forms Specialty Co., 38 F.3d at 877-78; EEOC 
v. Chicago Miniature Lamp Works, 947 F.2d at 295, 298, 300, 302-05. 
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automatically assume that either the general population or non-
affected population in a reference area defined by the recipient's 
jurisdiction is an appropriate comparison population. Conversely, 
while business interests correctly point out that Title VII and Title 
VI case law require the use of similarly situated comparison popu-
lations, these groups overstate the need for similarity between an 
affected population and an appropriate comparison population. 
Accordingly, it is appropriate, for instance, to compare an urban 
area with a heavy minority population with a suburban or rural 
area as long as these areas would meet all relevant minimum 
requirements for the proposed facility. 
A. It is Often Appropriate to Use General Population Statistics 
to Identify High-Risk Populations. 
One of the major goals of the Recipient Guidance is to help 
recipients identify areas where disparate impacts may exist and to 
reduce such impacts. Indeed, both draft guidance encourage recip-
. ients to identify geographic areas where disparate impacts may 
exist and to enter into area-specific agreements with the affected 
communities and polluters to reduce pollution impacts over a 
period of time. IS8 Similarly, the EPA's Title VI Advisory Commit-
tee had encouraged states to adopt preventative "Track 1" map-
ping programs to identify areas at high risk. 189 
To initially identify areas where there are high levels of pollution 
or potential disparate impacts, it is often useful to compare pollu-
tion levels in an area with statewide levels. For example, the State 
of New Jersey has adopted a program that compares the amount of 
pollution exposure experienced by selected subpopulations, the 
affected groups, with the general state population.19() The EPA is 
currently studying the New Jersey approach as a possible model for 
other states.191 Accordingly, as part of a program to avoid poten-
tial disparities, it is frequently appropriate for states or the EPA to 
compare a potentially affected population with general population 
statistics. However, comparisons between a minority subpopula-
188 See Guidance, supra note 5, at 39,651,39,653,39,657,39,662,39,674; infra notes 295-
99. 
189 See U.S. EPA, Office of Civil Rights, Report of the Title VI Implementation Com-
mittee, Next Steps for EPA, States, and Local Environmental Justice Programs http://es. 
epa.gov/oeca/oej/t6report.pdf (Mar. 1, 1999); Mank, Reforming State Brownfield Programs, 
supra note 29, at 159-61. 
190 See Steve Cook. Environmental Justice: De[ermining Disparate Environmental Impact 
on Group Difficult, 31 ENv'T REP.' (BNA) 2574 (Dec. 8,2000). 
191 Id. at 2574. 
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tion and a state's general population may sometimes understate the 
risk to some minority subpopulations that are more vulnerable or 
sensitive to particular chemical exposures and disease because of 
dietary, lifestyle or even genetic differences from the average 
member of the general population. 192 
Title VII courts have recognized that it may be appropriate to 
use general population statistics in making an initial determination 
about a disparate impact claim, "especially in cases ... in which the 
actual applicant pool might not reflect the potential applicant pool, 
due to a self-recognized inability on the part of potential applicants 
to meet the very standards challenged as discriminatory."193 For 
example, if otherwise qualified individuals did not apply for a job 
because the employer required having a high school diploma, but 
the court later determined that the diploma requirement was 
unnecessary then it may be appropriate for a court to examine gen-
eral population statistics just as the Court did in Griggs. 194 
Furthermore, if a facility could be sited anywhere in a recipient's 
jurisdiction, it may sometimes be apropos to use a general popula-
tion as the appropriate comparison group in making a final deter-
mination about whether an affected population is 
disproportionately affected by disparate impacts. Even under the 
logic of Wards Cove, the general population of an area could be an 
appropriate comparison group for some types of unskilled jobs. 
Similarly, for instance, if a light industrial facility could be sited 
virtually anywhere in a state then the state's general population 
might be an appropriate comparison group. 
192 See Eileen Gauna, The Environmental iustice Misfit: Public Participation and the Par-
adigm Paradox, 17 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3,. 33-34 (1998) (arguing water quality standards 
based upon amount and type of fish that average person eats do not protect minorities 
consuming more or different fish, especially bottom-dwelling or fatty fish); Kuehn, Quanti-
tative Risk Assessment, supra note 27, at 117-23, 151-53; Mank, Reforming State Brownfield 
Programs, supra note 29, at 139-43; Catherine A. O'Neill, Variable Justice: Environmental 
Standards, Contaminated Fish, and "Acceptable" Risk to Native Peoples, 19 STAN. ENVTL. 
LJ. 5, 70-85 (2000) (arguing water pollution has more severe impact on indigenous sub-
populations); Brian D. Israel, Comment, An Environmental Justice Critique of Risk Assess-
ment,3 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 469, 491-509 (1995) (discussing possibility that risk assessments 
may underestimate risk to certain groups because of multiple exposures and genetic, social, 
or lifestyle differences from average popUlation). 
193 EEOC v. Joint Apprenticeship Comm., 186 F.3d 110,119 (2d Cir. 1999). 
194 See id. 
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B. The Revised Investigation Guidance Fails to Require 
"Similarly Situated" Comparison Populations 
The Revised Investigation Guidance's discussion of comparison 
populations raises troubling questions in light of Title VII case law 
that requires a comparison population consist of similarly situated 
persons in the same relevant labor market. The Revised Investiga-
tion Guidance states that the EPA may use a recipient's jurisdic-
. tion as the "reference area" for defining the relevant comparison 
population. 195 Additionally, the Revised Investigation Guidance 
states that the EPA may use either the general population or the 
non-affected population of a recipient's jurisdiction as an appropri-
ate comparison population. l <J6 
The Revised Investigation Guidance fails to address Title VII 
cases that require a plaintiff seeking to establish a prima facie case 
to demonstrate that a proposed comparison population is similarly 
situated to the affected population. 197 Additionally, while there 
are few Title VI cases that have explicitly addressed the issue of 
selecting appropriate comparison population, the best analogy to 
the requirement in Title VII law that a comparison population con-
sist of qualified workers in the same relevant job market is to 
require in Title VI cases that a comparison ·area be suitable for the 
challenged facility by meeting all relevant minimum requirements. 
In light of Beazer, Hazelwood, and Wards Cove, the Revised 
Investigation Guidance fails to address the need to select similarly 
situated comparison populations rather than just using the general 
population of a political or agency jurisdiction. It is inappropriate 
to automatically find a prima facie case of discrimination whenever 
an affected area has a level of risk different from the general popu-
lation in an area. For example, if a facility requires special geologi-
calor transportation criteria, then any comparison area must meet 
the minimum requirements for siting the facility. 198 For example, a 
mass transit project may only be suitable in high density, urban 
locations. It would be inappropriate to compare a proposed urban 
site for a light rail transit system to a rural location that is unsuita-
195 Guidance, supra note 5, at 39,681; Mank, Draft Guidance, supra note 5, at 11,169. 
196 /d. 
197 See supra notes 145-87. 
198 See Mank, Recipient Agencies, supra note 73, at 826-28 (arguing Title VI allows recip-
ient to justify siting decision based on legitimate safety, geological, or transportation 
criteria). 
2001] Proving an Environmental Justice Case 403 
ble for such a project. 199 Instead, it w.ould be appropriate to use 
only relatively urbanized areas that would also be suitable for the 
proposed project as comparison areas. However, a suburban area 
might be a similarly situated site if it meets the basic criteria for 
siting the light rail project. As discussed below, business groups 
that argue that the comparison area must be almost the same in 
terms of land use overstate the need for similarity.20o 
The EPA should amend the Revised Investigation Guidance to 
require the Agency to use only similarly situated comparison popu-
lations. Furthermore, the EPA needs to develop explicit criteria 
for determining how it will select similarly situated comparison 
populations. Such criteria will provide guidance for permit appli-
cants, recipients, and potential civil rights advocates in evaluating 
whether a proposed permit action could raise issues of disparate 
impacts. 
C. A Comparison Population or Area Does Not Have to Have a 
Similar Range of Activities 
Some business commentators contend that the principle in Title 
VI and VII case law that comparison populations must be "simi-
larly situated" with an affected popUlation mandates that there 
must be a close similarity in activities and land uses between those 
populations.201 For instance, they maintain that the EPA should 
not compare an affected population living in highly urban or indus-
trial area with a statewide population that is largely suburban or 
rural. Instead, some business commentators argue that the EPA 
should compare the affected population to a comparison popula-
tion that lives in an area with a similar range of residential, indus-
trial and commercial uses.2°2 
However, the argument that a comparison population must have 
a "similar balance to the affected population of rural, urban and 
199 See Steinberg, supra note 106, at 84-85 (arguing it is inappropriate to compare a 
minority population affected by transportation project to general popUlation if project 
could only be sited in minority area). See also Vicki Been, Environmental Justice and 
Equity Issues, in 4 PATRICK J. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS 
§ 25D.04[3][g][i], 91-92 (Matthew Bender, ed. 1990) (arguing comparison area must be 
suitable for proposed facility at issue) [hereinafter Been, Environmental Justice and Equity 
Issues]; Mank, Recipient Agencies, supra note 73, at 800-01. 
200 See supra note 17 and infra notes 201-03. 
201 See API, supra note 17, at 11; BNEJ, supra note 17, at 19-20; Mank, Draft Guidance, 
supra note 5, at 11,169 (citing BNEJ, supra note 17, at 19-20); Steinberg, supra note 106, at 
84-85. 
202 See BNEJ, supra note 17, at 19-20; Mank, Draft Guidance, supra note 5, at 11,169 
(citing BNEJ, supra note 17, at 19-20); Steinberg, supra note 106, at 84-85. 
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suburban areas, with a similar range of residential, commercial and 
industrial activities"203 is more restrictive than necessary under 
Title VI or Title VII. In employment discrimination cases, the key 
issue is whether a comparison population is comprised of "quali-
fied" potential employees. For instance, it is not necessary that 
minority applicants have exactly the same educational or occupa-
tional skills as others in the relevant labor pool as a whole as long 
as all included in a comparison are qualified for the job-at-issue. 
For example, in Griggs .there was no evidence that the lower educa-
tional attainment of minority applicants had any effect on their 
ability to perform the jobs at issue.204 Indeed, there was evidence 
that white employees who lacked high school diplomas had per-
formed well in the past and received promotions,z°5 In presenting 
a prima facie case, a plaintiff need only demonstrate that a minor-
ity population allegedly subject to discrimination is "similarly situ-
ated" to others in the relevant job market, not that all their 
characteristics are the same. 
Similarly, in an environmental siting case, a comparison popula-
tion should be located in an area that would be suitable for the 
facility in question, meeting all relevant minimum requirements.206 
Because there are multiple factors or requirements for most indus-
trial facilities, including land suitability, transportation access, or 
availability of potential employees, it is often more complex in a 
siting case than an employment case to decide whether a compari-
son population or area is similarly situated.207 Nevertheless, the 
mix of residential, commercial and industrial activities does not 
necessarily have to be the same for an area to be a qualified com-
parison area. It is enough that a comparison area is similarly situ-
ated in its ability to operate a facility similar to that in question in 
the affected area. If an industrial facility could have been sited in 
either a heavily minority urban area or a predominantly white sub-
urb, the EPA ought to compare the two areas to see if there are 
significant disparities. While it is often more difficult in environ-
mental siting cases to decide whether two different areas share 
enough of the relevant requirements for a proposed facility to com-
203 BNEJ, sllpra note 17, at 19-20; Mank, Draft Guidance, supra note 5, at 11,169 (citing 
BNEJ, supra note 17, at 19-20); Steinberg, supra note 106, at 84-85. 
204 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971). 
205 Id. at 431-32. 
206 See Been, Environmental Justice and Equity Issues, supra note 199, at 
§ 25D.04[3][g][i], 90-92; Mank, Recipient Agencies, supra note 73, at 800-01. 
207 Mank, Recipient Agencies, supra note 73, at 826-28 (discussing use of legitimate 
safety, geological, or transportation criteria to justify siting decision). 
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pare than it is to decide whether workers are "qualified" and in the 
same relevant job market, in both Title VI siting cases and Title 
VII employment cases the essential issue is whether a comparison 
group is "similarly situated" and not whether the affected area and 
comparison area are exactly the same. 
D. Distinguishing Between a Prima Facie Case and a 
Defendant's Burden of Establishing Business Necessity. 
1. The Defendant'S Burden of Proof Under the 1991 Civil 
Rights Act 
A distinction needs to be made between the plaintiff's burden of 
proof in establishing a prima facie case and a defendant's burden of 
showing that a challenged practice that causes disparate impacts is 
justified by business or educational necessity.20B In Wards Cove, 
the Supreme Court had held that, after a plaintiff establishes a 
prima facie case, the burden of going forward shifts to the defen-
dant, but that the ultimate burden of persuasion always remains 
with the plaintiff.2°'! However, in the 1991 Civil Rights Act, Con-
gress rejected that holding and instead placed both the burdens of 
production and per.suasion on the defendant once a plaintiff sets 
forth a prima facie case.2j(J The 1991 Act explicitly amended Title 
VII to place the burden of persuasion on the defendant to "demon-
strate that the challenged practice is job related for the position in 
question and consistent with business necessity," unless the defen-
dant has rebutted the plaintiff's prima case by "demonstrat[iilg] 
that a specific employment practice does not cause the disparate 
impact.,,211 The 1991 Act does not explicitly apply to Title VI, but 
208 See Susan S. Grover, The Business Necessity Defellse in Disparate Impact Discrimina-
tion Cases, 30 GA. L. REV. 387.394 (1996); Mahoney, supra note 126, at 424; Mank, Recipi-
ent Agencies, supra note 73, at 801-02. 
209 Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659-60 (1989); Mahoney, supra 
note 126, at 452-53. 
210 Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 105(a), 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(k) (2000); see also Bradley v. 
Pizzaco of Neb., 7 F.3d 795, 797-99 (8th CiT. 1993) (holding in Title VII case that 1991 Act 
places burden of persuasion regarding business necessity on defendant); Fitzpatrick v. City 
of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1117 & n.5 (11th CiT. 1993) (same); Frazier v. Garrison Indep. Sch. 
Dis!., 980 F.2d 1514, 1529 n.34 (5th CiT. 1993) (same); Been, Environmental Justice and 
Equity Issues, SIlpra note 199, at § 25 D.04[3][g], 87-88 n.85; Mahoney, supra note 126, at 
454-55; Mank, Recipient Agencies, supra note 73, at 802. 
2lJ Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 105(a), 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i), (8)(ii); see also 
Elston v. Talladega County 8d. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1407 n. 14 (11th Cir. 1993); Maho-
ney, supra note 126, at 454-55. The 1991 Act defines "demonstrate" as requiring a defen-
dant to "meet the burdens of production and persuasion." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(m); see 
Mahoney, supra note 126, at 454-55; Mank, Recipient Agencies, supra note 73, at 802 n.76. 
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courts in Title VI cases have generally followed the scheme in the 
1991 Civil Rights Act by placing the burden of proof on Title VI 
defendants to either rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case or to jus-
tify their actions.212 
2. The Prima Facie Case Should Address Objective, Minimum 
Qualifications 
There is some confusion in Title VII law about whether a plain-
tiff must address relative qualifications in its prima facie case and 
hence consider such issues in delineating an appropriate compari-
son population, but most Title VII cases only require a plaintiff in 
her prima facie case to show that she meets the objective, mini-
mum qualifications for a job and then place the burden on the 
defendant to show that they hired a better qualified worker than 
the plaintiff.2 13 This issue is important because it has implications 
for how similarly situated a comparison population must be to the 
affected population. If relative qualifications come in at the prima 
facie stage of litigation, arguably business commentators might be 
right that a comparison population must be very similar to the 
affected population.214 However, a number of Title VII cases have 
emphasized that a plaintiff's prima facie case need only establish 
that the plaintiff is qualified for the job-at-issue, and, by implica-
tion, then a comparison population need only meet the objective, 
minimum standards for a job or siting a facility.z15 
In footnote· 44 of the Teamsters case, the Supreme Court sug-
gested that whether a plaintiff is "qualified" might refer not only to 
objective, mlmmum job credentials, but also to relative 
qualifications: 
212 See Ass'n of Mexican-American Educators v. California, 231 F.3d 572, 584 & n.7 (9th 
Cir. 2000) (stating burden is on defendani once plaintiff in Title VI case establishes prima· 
facie case); Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d 484, 507 (11 th Cir. 1999) (stating if plaintiff estab-
lishes prima facie case then defendant has burden of establishing substantial legitimate 
justification, citing Elston), cert. granted, Alexander v. Sandoval, 121 S. Ct. 28 (U.S. Sept. 
26,2000); Elston, 997 F.2d at 1407 n.14; Mank, Recipient Agencies, supra note 73, at 802; 
Worsham, supra note 56, at 685-88; out see African American Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. N.Y. 
State Dep't. of Educ., 8 F. Supp. 2d 330, 338 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (stating that the "analyti-
cal framework for disparate impact cases under Title VI regulations is the same as that for 
Title VII cases," but ignoring 1991 Civil Rights Act and declaring that the burden of per-
suasion remains on the plaintiff). 
213 See Alisa D. Shudofsky, Note, Relative Qualifications and the Prima Facie Case in 
Title VII Litigation, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 553 (1982); infra notes 218, 222-23. 
214 See infra notes 216-17. 
215 See infra notes 218-23. 
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The McDonnell Douglas formula ... does demand that the 
alleged discriminatee demonstrate at least that his rejection 
did not result from the two most common legitimate reasons 
on which an employer might rely to reject a job applicant: an 
absolute or relative lack of qualifications or the absence of a 
vacancy in the job sought.216 
407 
While the Court used the phrase "absolute or relative" only to 
describe a "lack of qualifications," the Seventh Circuit has inter-
preted the language in the footnote to refer to the necessary quali-
fications as being either absolute or relative and, therefore, 
required plaintiffs in their prima facie case to prove they are as 
well or more qualified than successful applicants.217 
Many federal courts of appeals decisions have concluded that the 
Teamsters' footnote did not change the allocation of proof set forth 
in McDonnell Douglas and that a plaintiff need only show in estab-
lishing a prima facie case that she meets the basic; minimum 
requirements for a job.2lB First, Teamsters concerned the prima 
facie case for a class action and did not involve the standard for a 
private, non-class action.219 Additionally, Teamsters discussed 
McDonnell Douglas as holding that a prima facie case is estab-
lished by a "qualified applicant."22o While the Supreme Court has 
not clearly addressed the issue of whether a prima facie case must 
216 In!'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 n.44 (1977). 
217 Holder v. Old Ben Coal Co., 618 F.2d 1198 (7th Cir. 1980); see also David N. Rosen 
& Jonathan M. Freiman, Remodeling McDonnell Douglas: Fisher v. Vassar College and the 
Structure of Employment Law, 17 QU1NNIPIAC L. REV. 725, 753 n.142 (1998) (stating that 
the Seventh Circuit is the only federal circuit to interpret Teamsters to require plaintiff to 
address relative qualifications in prima facie case); Shudofsky, supra note 213, at 558. 
218 See EEOC v. Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp., 220 F.3d 1184, 1192-93 (10th Cir. 
2000) (stating that plaintiff satisfies "her prima facie burden of showing she is qualified by 
presenting some credible evidence that she possesses the objective qualifications necessary 
to perform the job at issue); Anderson v. Zubieta, 180 FJd 329, 342 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (hold-
ing that the plaintiff can meet his prima facie burden by establishing he possesses those 
"objective qualifications that can be shown to be truly required to do the job at issue"); 
Walker v. Mortham, 158 F.3d 1177, 1190 (11th Cir. 1998) (explaining "relative qualifica-
tions are placed in the second stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework, not the prima 
facie stage"), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 809 (1999); Gafford v. Gen. EIec. Co., 997 F.2d 150, 166 
(6th Cir. 1993); Mitchell v. Baldridge, 759 F.2d 80, 84-86 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Lynn v. Regents 
of the Univ. of Cal., 656 F.2d 1337,1344-45 (9th Cir. 1981); Stanojev v. Ebasco Serv., Inc., 
643 F.2d 914, 919 (2d Cir. 1981) (stating Teamsters requires plaintiff to show only that he 
"possesses the basic skills necessary for the performance of the job" (quoting Powell v. 
Syracuse Univ., 580 F.2d 1150, 1155 (2d Cir. 1978»; Rosen & Freiman, supra note 217, at 
753 n.142 (stating the Seventh Circuit is the only federal circuit to interpret Teamsters to 
require plaintiff to address relative qualifications in prima facie case). 
219 See Mitchell, 759 F.2d at 85. 
220 Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 357-58. See also Mitchell, 759 F.2d at 85 (discussing 
. Teamsters). 
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address relative qualifications, during 1981, in the important case 
of Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, the Court 
reiterated the McDonnell Douglas standards and did not suggest 
that a plaintiff must now prove· relative qualifications.22I Some 
courts have suggested that the issue of relative or subjective quali-
fications is best left to the second and third stages of the process so 
that the defendant can introduce relative qualifications in their 
rebuttal and the plaintiff in turn can address whether the defen-
dant's claim of superior qualifications is a pretext for discrimina-
tion.222 In Mitchell v. Baldridge, the federal appeals court for 
District of Columbia circuit stated: "we read the somewhat delphic 
Teamsters footnote as contemplating qualifications relative to the 
entire pool from which applications are welcome, rather than qual-
ifications relative only to those eventually selected."223 Accord-
ingly, a plaintiff in their prima facie case need only establish that 
she is qualified based on objective, minimum standards. 
In the absence of controlling Supreme Court precedent and 
numerous federal courts of appeals decisions emphasizing that a 
prima facie case should rest on objective, minimum qualifications, 
the EPA should simply address objective, minimum siting require-
ments in deciding whether there is a prima facie case of disparate 
impact discrimination and in selecting comparison populations. 
The recipient is in a better position to explain why the approved 
site is a superior location than comparison sites that meet objec-
tive, minimum requirements.224 
Accordingly, in assessing a Title VI complaint, the EPA should 
compare a proposed site in a minority area with comparison areas 
that meet the relevant minimum qualifications for the proposed 
facility.225 If the percentage of protected minority groups in appro-
221 Tex. Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,253 & n.6 (1981); see also 
Mitchell, 759 F.2d at 85 (discussing Burdine). 
222 See EEOC, 220 F.3d at 1194 (stating subjective qualifications "are more properly 
considered at second stage of McDonnell Douglas analysis"); Mitchell, 759 F.2d at 85 (stat-
ing subjective or relative qualifications should not be considered in plaintiff's prima facie 
case); Lynll, 656 F.2d at 1344 (stating "[Sjubjective criteria ... are best treated in the later 
stages of the process."). 
223 Mitchell, 759 F.2d at 85. 
224 See generally Mank, Recipient Agencies, supra nQte 73, at 815-22 (arguing Title VI 
recipients should have the burden of demonstrating there are no less discriminatory alter-
natives to a proposed site because recipient has better access to such information than 
most complainants). 
225 See generally Guidance, supra note 5, at 39,654, 39,681-82 (discussing how EPA in 
Title VI investigation will compare affected popUlations to comparison popUlations and 
assess disparity); Mank, Draft Guidance, supra note 5, at 11,168-69; supra notes 13-16, 198-
200,206-07, 213. 
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priate comparison populations and areas is significantly less than in 
the proposed area, then the EPA should continue its investigation 
to determine whether these disparities are unjustified.22fi For 
example, a recipient could argue that lower land costs made a 
minority site a better choice than other less discriminatory alterna-
tives that met minimum requirements for the proposed facility. As 
discussed in Part VILD, the EPA would then examine whether this 
. justification was legitimate.227 
Some concerns from business commentators are that urban areas 
may not be similar to suburban or rural areas. For example, if a 
suburban area would be suitable for a proposed urban fq.cility, the 
EPA may use the suburban area for comparison because it may be 
similarly situated enough to serve as the basis for an initial prima 
facie case. Later, when presenting a non-discriminatory reason for 
the proposed siting, a Title VI recipient might demonstrate, for 
instance, that land in the heavily minority urban area that it 
selected or approved was relatively less costly than in the compari-
son suburban area and that cost difference might be a valid justifi-
cation for any disparate impacts to minorities living in the vicinity 
of the proposed urban site.228 
V. EXISTING ApPROACHES TO SELECTING AFFECTED 
POPULATIONS AND COMPARISON GROUPS FAIL TO 
ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF SIMILARLY 
SITUATED POPULATIONS 
The two main existing approaches for defining appropriate com-
parison populations do not address whether they are similarly situ-
ated to the affected population. The selection of the comparison 
population is important because it often will affect the result of any 
disparity study .. According to one commentator: 
Choosing the unit of population for comparison is the first 
factor that will affect the results of the disparate impact 
analysis. To construct an accurate study, the analyst must 
determine the size of the affected area and compare the 
demographic profile of that region with the demographics of 
226 See Guidance, supra note 5, at 39,654, 39,681-82 (discussing how EPA in Title VI 
investigation will compare affected populations to comparison popUlations and assess dis-
parity); Mank, Draft Guidance, supra note 5, at 11,168-69. 
227 See infra notes 305-09. 
228 See Mank, Recipient Agencies, supra note 73, at 801-07. 
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unaffected areas within the defendant's decision making 
jurisdiction.22lJ 
There are two coinmon approaches to defining both affected 
populations and comparison populations. The first approach is to 
use pre-ordained units of comparison, such as census tracts or zip 
codes, for which demographic information is already known.230 
The second approach is to use radial or proximity studies that com-
pare the racial demographics of the population immediately sur-
rounding a polluting facility with the racial demographics of a 
larger population by drawing a concentric circle around the facil-
ity.231 A serious problem with both pre-ordained units of compari-
son and proximity studies is that there is no guarantee that the 
comparison population is "similarly situated" with the affected 
populations. It is possible to apply a fine-tuning approach by ini-
tially selecting a comparison population, using either of these two 
methods, and then adjusting the geographic area and comparison 
population established to ensure that the comparison population is 
similarly situated to the affected population. However, to fine-
tune either of these two methods requires further siting analysis 
about whether the comparison area initially selected by using one 
of these two approaches is suitable for the proposed facilities at 
issue. 
A. Pre-Ordained Units of Comparison 
Most studies of environmental discrimination use pre-ordained 
units of comparison, such as census tracts or zip codes, for which 
demographic information is already known.232 One problem with 
these types of studies in the past has been that there was no 
accepted definition for which unit of analysis was best. Most com-
mentators preferred census tracts because they are usually smaller 
in size than zip code areas.233 Disparity studies often reach differ-
ent results depending upon which pre-ordained units of compari-
son are employed. For example, a study based on the percentage 
229 See Fisher, supra note 35, at 322. 
230 /d.; See Worsham, supra note 56, at 690. 
231 See Adams, supra note 117, at 426 n.60; Been, Market Dynamics, supra note 33, at 
1392-94; Fisher, supra note 35, at 323; Worsham, supra note 56, at 690. 
232 See Fisher, supra note 35, at 322; Worsham, supra note 5{), at 690. 
233 See generally Bradford C. Mank, Environmental Justice and Discriminatory Siting: 
Risk-Based Representation and Equitable Compensation, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 329, 343 n.59, 
390-92 & n.373 (1995) (discussing how use of different definitions of subpopulations or 
geographical areas can dramatically affect research results); Mohai, supra note 32 at 619; 
Zimmerman, supra note 32, at 665-69; infra notes 234-35. 
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of minorities in the census tract surrounding a facility may come to 
a different result than one that examines the numbers of minorities 
in the neighboring zip code areas, which are generally larger than 
census tracts.234 The EPA has at least largely solved the problem of 
which unit of comparison to use by stating that it will use the small-
est geographic area possible for the demographic data, such as cen-
sus blocks, when conducting disparity assessments.235 
Nevertheless, the Agency's decision to use the smallest pre-
ordained unit of comparison possible does not solve another prob-
lem. A central criticism of using pre-ordained units of comparison 
such as census tracts or zip codes is that they "bear[ ] no relation-
ship to the area impacted by the polluting facility."236 Such a unit 
of comparison may either over-include persons who are not 
affected by the pollution or under-include those who are.237 If the 
selected comparison group is over- or under-inclusive, a court or 
agency may inappropriately find disproportionate impacts or fail to 
find actual disparate impacts.238 Furthermore, even if the unit of 
analysis and the impacted area are roughly the same, current mod-
els often fail to address whether some persons in an area are 
exposed to more pollution or greater health risks because of pre-
vailing winds or currents.239 
Some commentators have proposed that environmental agencies 
begin their analysis by examining pre-ordained units to initially 
identify the racial demographics of the affected population, but 
then investigate how that data may fail to address impacts on popu-
lations outside those boundaries, or may underestimate concen-
trated impacts on minority populations within those units.240 For 
example, the presence of multiple facilities within a small area 
within the larger unit may increase the cumulative impact of pollu-
234 Been, Market Dynamics, supra note 33, at 1401 n.73, 1402-03 n.84 (arguing census 
tracts are more reliable means to define community than zip code areas); Been & Gupta, 
supra note 24, at 10-13 (citing sources and contending census tracts are generally more 
reliable means to define community than zip code areas). 
235 Guidance, supra note 5, at 39,681; Mank, Draft Guidance, supra note 5, at 11,168. 
There is a danger with using too small of a unit of analysis because the comparison area 
may contain part of the affected area and may not then represent a true comparison area. 
See Mohai, supra note 32, at 650. 
236 Fisher, supra note 35, at 323; see also Worsham, supra note 56, at 690. 
237 See Fisher, supra note 35, at 323; Worsham, supra note 56, at 690. 
238 See Thomas A. Lambert, The Case Against Private Disparate Impact Suits, 34 GA. L. 
REV. 1155, 1190-91 (2000); see also Fisher, supra note 35, at 323; Worsham, supra note 56, 
at 690. 
239 See Fisher, supra note 35, at 323; Worsham, supra note 56, at 690. 
240 See Fisher, supra note 35, at 323-24; Worsham, supra note 56, at 692. 
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tion on those living in the smaller area.241 Using additional data 
based on the use of pre-ordained units to fine-tune an agency's ini-
tial findings makes sense, but raises important questions about 
where the agency will obtain any supplemental information and 
what type of methodologies it will use to refine its initial analyses. 
B. Radial or Proximity ·Studies 
Some commentators argue that it is better to use a radial study 
approach that compares the racial demographics of a larger popu-
lation with the racial demographics of the population immediately 
surrounding a polluting facility, as determined by drawing a con-
centric circle around a facility.242 However, this approach is more 
resource-intensive than using data from pre-measured units.243 
Additionally, radial studies do not necessarily examine the actual 
environmental risk faced by different populations244 
The EPA used a radial analysis in examining whether Shintech's 
proposed $700 million PVC plant in Convent, Louisiana would 
cause racially disparate impacts.245 In 1997, the Tulane Environ-
mental Law Clinic filed a Title VI complaint against the Shin tech 
proposal on behalf of African-American residents in Convent, 
alleging that it would create disparate impacts based on race.246 
The complaint argued that there would be significant disparate 
impacts because the community was predominaritly African-Amer-
ican, and because of the significant environmental burdens already 
harming the area.247 For example, ninety-five percent of the 300 
people living within one mile of the proposed plant were black, and 
forty-nine percent of the households had incomes of less than 
$15,000.241{ The proposed plant was to be located in Convent, a 
241 See Fisher, supra note 35, at 323-24; Worsham, supra note 56, at 692, 697; see gener-
ally Collin & Collin, supra note 29, at 55-57; Kuehn, Quantitative Risk Assessment, supra 
note 27, at 117-23, 151-53; Mank, Reforming State Brownfield Programs, supra note 29, at 
141-42. 
242 Adams, supra note 117, at 426 n.60; Been, Market Dynamics, supra note 33, at 1392-
94; Fisher, supra note 35, at 323; Worsham, supra note 56, at 690. 
243 See Fisher, supra note 35, at 323; Worsham, supra note 56, at 691. 
244 See Adams, supra note 117, at 426 n.60; Been, Market Dynamics, supra note 33, at 
1392-94. 
245 Shintech Demographic Information, supra note 109; see Mank, Title VI, supra note 4, 
at 45-48; Worsham, supra note 56, at 656-59, 691; Cary Silverman, Note, EPA's Interim 
Guidance on Investigating Title VI Administrative Complaints Challenging Permits: The 
Bumpy Road Toward a Federal Environmental Civil Rights Policy, 6 ENVTL. L. 135, n.148 
(1999). 
246 Mank, Title VI, supra note 4, at 45-46; Worsham, slipra note 56, at 657. 
247 Mank, Title VI, supra note 4, at 46; Worsham, supra note 56, at 657-58. 
248 Mank, Title VI, supra note 4, at 46; Worsham, supra note 56, at 658. 
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town in the industrial corridor between Baton Rouge and New 
Orleans already known as "cancer alley" because of the number of 
petrochemical industries within its boundaries.24l) 
In the EPA's Shintech investigation, the Agency relied on census 
data to determine the racial makeup of communities within one-, 
two-, and four-mile radii of the proposed plant location, and com-
pared these to the racial composition of the state and of the other 
affected geographic regions.2so The EPA examined the percentage 
of minority persons within the test radii for each geographic and 
facility universe, and then compared those percentages with the 
percentage of minority persons in the state as a whole.2s1 The EPA 
found that African-Americans represented over eighty percent of 
the population within each of the one-, two-, and four-mile radial 
areas around the proposed site, but less than fifty percent of the 
population of St. James Parish and only thirty point eight percent 
of Louisiana's total population,zs2 The EPA also sought to address 
to what extent African-Americans were more likely to live near 
Shin tech by examining to what extent they were likely to live near 
other facilities in the state that emitted toxic air pollutants.2s3 
While the Shintech study was the EPA's most sophisticated 
effort at analyzing disparate impacts and is referred to as a model 
in the Revised Investigation Guidance,2s4 many environmental jus-
tice advocates argued that the EPA's methodology seriously under-
estimated the extent to which African-Americans had a higher 
probability of living in proximity to the Shintech site than did non-
African-Americans.2ss Nevertheless, despite disagreement about 
findings in the EPA's Shintech study, the EPA's statistical evidence 
249 Mank, Title VI, supra note 4, at 46; Worsham, supra note 56, at 658. 
250 Keith N. Cole & Carita T. Shanklin, Environmental Permits as Civil Rights Viola-
tions: Three Recent Developments in a Rapidly Emerging Area of Law, METRO. CORP. 
COUNS., July 1998, at 9, col. 1; David Sive & Lemuel M. Srolovic, Environmental Justice 
Issues Develop Facility Permits and Civil Rights, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 26,1998, at Sl, col. 1; Wor-
sham, supra note 56, at 691; see Mank, Title VI, supra note 4, at 48. 
251 Cole & Shanklin, supra note 250, at 9, col. 1; Worsham, supra note 56, at 691. The 
Agency was not yet able to measure the comparative harmfulness of the pollutants at issue, 
but hopes to be able to address that issue when it conducts similar studies in the future. 
252 Shintech Demographi~ Information, supra note 109, at 12-13 & attachment 3; 
Silverman, supra note 245, at 135. 
253 Similarity was determined by Standard Industrial Category (SIC) code, release of 
similar pollutants, and varying amounts of Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) releases. Cole & 
Shanklin, supra note 250, at 9, col. 1; Worsham, supra note 56, at 691 n.386. 
254 See Guidance, supra note 5, at 39,681-82 n.134-137 (citing Shintech Demographic 
Information, supra note 109). 
255 See Cole & Shanklin, supra note 250, at 9, col. I; Worsham, supra note 56, at 691 
n.389. 
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showing that African-Americans were disproportionately likely to 
live near the proposed Shin tech facility arguably would have met 
the standard of proof set forth in the Revised Investigation Gui-
dance and, therefore, the Agency potentially could have found that 
the proposed permit action violated its Title VI disparate impact 
regulations.256 
Because of strong disagreements between industry and environ-
mental justice advocates about how to measure disparate impacts, 
the EPA never resolved the Title VI complaint against Shintech.257 
Instead, the Agency concluded that Shintech's proposed air permit 
was flawed because it did not address all potential sources of pollu-
tion.258 Shintech ultimately suspended plans to build the $700 mil-
lion facility in Convent and announced on September 17, 1998, that 
it would pursue instead a permit for a smaller $250 million plant in 
the up-river town of Plaquemine, Louisiana.259 
The Shintech study demonstrates both the advantages and disad-
vantages of using radial studies. The radial study used in Shin tech 
was probably more accurate in measuring the amount of actual dis-
parities than a study using pre-ordained units, but the radial study 
was more costly and time consuming. The disagreements between 
environmental justice advocates and industry about how to inter-
pret the data shows that radial studies do not always provide clear, 
easy answers to complex issues about environmental siting. 
The EPA's independent Science Advisory Board (the "SAB") 
has recommended improvements to the Agency's approach for 
conducting radial studies and measuring disproportionate impact 
and cumulative effects in Title VI complaints.26o Any improve-
ments in measuring risk, however, would not address the more 
256 See John McQuaid, Environmental iustice Revisited in New EPA Plan, NEW ORLE-
ANS TIME-PICAYUNE, June 20, 2000, at AOl available at 2000 WL 21266333 (discussing 
EPA data showing proposed Shin tech facility in St. James Parish, Louisiana would have 
"disproportionately affect[edJ black residents in St. James by a factor ranging from 2 times 
to 3 times, depending on the type of plant"). 
257 ManK, Title VI, supra note 4, at 47-48. 
258 Id. 
259 Mank, Title VI, supra note 4, at 48; Worsham, supra note 56, at 659. 
260 For instance, the SAB studied the EPA's new Cumulative Outdoors Air Toxics Con-
centration Exposure Methodology (COATCEM), which evaluates the cumulative impacts 
of cancer and non-cancer risk separately. The SAB recommended that the Agency 
examine the potential risk to all populations, whether significant or de minimis, before 
estimating the extent of any disproportionate impact. See Science Advisory Board, An 
SAB Report: Review of Disproportionate Impact Methodologies, EPA-SAB-IHEC-99-
007, 1-3 (Dec. 1998); see also Cheryl Hogue, SAB Recommends Steps for EPA in Analyses 
of Disproportionate Impacts, 29 ENv'T REP. (BNA) 1310, 1310-11 (Oct. 30, 1998). 
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ba.sic question of whether a proposed comparison site would be 
suitable for the facility at issue. 
C. Risk Assessment 
To measure the actual risk posed by a facility to different popula-
tions and separate geographic areas, an agency would need to 
undertake complex and expensive risk analyses.261 Such risk analy-
ses often have serious weaknesses because of limits in scientific 
knowledge.262 Scientists frequently cannot precisely measure the 
risks of many carcinogens or the synergistic interaction of different 
chemicals.263 Furthermore, there are many unanswered questions 
about how different chemicals may affect minority subpopulations 
that have different diets, occupational exposures or lifestyles than 
the "average" adult males often used as the model in standard risk 
analyses.264 Finally, because of the uncertainties in measuring risk, 
opposing parties often reach significantly different results when 
they use risk assessment to either justify or criticize a proposaU65 
The EPA probably does not need to perform an extensive or 
comprehensive risk assessment before selecting a comparison pop-
ulation in a Title VI case, but the Agency will likely consider this 
issue when reaching a final decision about whether there are 
adverse disparate impacts. Business interests have argued that 
261 See generally Mank, Reforming State Brownfield Programs, supra note 29, at 136-39, 
165-66 (discussing complexities, uncertainties, and expense of risk assessment); O'Neill, 
supra note 192, at 21-36; Alon Rosenthal, Legislating Acceptable Cancer Risk From Expo-
sure to Toxic Chemicals, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 269,277-95 (1992) (discussing basic components 
of quantitative risk assessment). 
262 See generally Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmelltal Law: A Normative 
Critique of Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 562 passim (1992) (criticizing 
quantitative risk assessment for overstating its capability to measure risk ); O'Neill, supra 
note 192, at 24-36 (criticizing quantitative risk assessment for overstating its capability to 
measure risk and failing to address distributional issues and differences in individual sus-
ceptibility to chemicals). 
263 Kuehn, Quantitative Risk Assessment, supra note 27, at 117-23, 151-53; Mank, 
Reforming State Brownfield Programs, supra note 29, at 139-43; O'Neill, supra note 192, at 
24-36; Israel, supra note 192, at 491-504. 
264 See Gauna, supra note 192, at 33-34 (arguing water quality standards based upon 
amount and type of fish that average person eats does not protect minorities consuming 
more or different fish, especially bottom-dwelling or fatty fish); Kuehn, Quantitative Risk 
. Assessment, supra note 27, at 117-23, 151-52; Mank, Reforming State Brownfield Programs, 
supra note 29, at 139-43; O'Neill, supra note 192, at 70-85 (arguing water pollution has 
more severe impact on indigenous subpopulations); Israel, supra note 192, at 491-509. 
265 Kuehn, Quantitative Risk Assessment, supra note 27, at 133-39 (arguing that industry 
can manipulate risk assessments to minimize the proposal's possible risk to minority popu-
lations); O'Neill, supra note 192, at 27-30 (arguing that quantitative risk assessments are 
highly malleable). 
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comparison populations should have a range of activities and pre-
sumably a risk similar to the allegedly affected area.2M However, 
Title VII's requirement that comparisons be made between quali-
fied workers in the same relevant job market case law suggests that 
the similarly situated standard as applied in the context of facility 
siting means simply that a comparison area is suitable for the facil-
ity at issue and satisfies all relevant minimum requirements.267 
Accordingly, it is probably not necessary for the EPA to ensure 
that the total level of risks in any comparison area that the agency 
selects is roughly equivalent to those in the affected area. It is 
important to remember that the selection of a comparison popula-
tion is part of the preliminary task of establishing a prima facie 
case of discrimination. In reaching its final decision about whether 
there is a significant adverse impact, however, the issue of dispro-
portionate risks is important and may require some measurement 
of actual risks.268 
D. Fine- Tuning the Comparison Population 
It is possible to apply a fine-tuning approach that addresses 
whether the geographic area and comparison population estab-
lished by using either pre-ordained units or radial analysis needs to 
be adjusted so that the comparison population is as similarly situ-
ated as possible to the affected population. There are many possi-
ble demographic or environmental criteria that could be compared 
to determine to what extent a possible comparison area is similar 
or different from an allegedly affected'population. This article has 
argued that the single most important question about whether two 
areas and populations are similarly situated for purposes of envi-
ronmental siting and permitting challenges is usually whether the 
proposed facility that is to be located in the affected area also 
could be located in the potential comparison area,z69 As discussed 
in Section VII, the recipient or the EPA should begin its task of 
selecting a comparison population by examining existing siting 
information to determine whether a proposed comparison area is 
suitable for the challenged facility. 
266 API, supra note 17, at 11; BNEJ, supra note 17, at 19-20; Mank, Draft Guidance, 
supra note 5, at 11,169 (citing BNEJ, supra note 17, at 19-20); Steinberg, supra note 106, at 
84-85. 
267 See supra notes 13-16, 198-200,206-07,213,225. 
268 Guidance, supra note 5, at 39,661, 39,681-82; Mank, Draft Guidance, supra note 5, at 
11,169-70. 
269 See generally Been, Environmental Justice and Equity Issues, supra note 199, at 
§ 25D.04[3)[gJ[i], 90-92; Mank, Recipient Agencies, supra note 73, at 800-01. 
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COMPARISON SITES 
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The EPA should initially examine information from both state 
and federal environmental programs to determine whether a pro-
posed comparison area would be suitable for the challenged facil-
ity. There are many sources of information that the Agency could 
use t6 select an appropriate comparison population, but informa-
tion generated during state or federal permitting processes is a 
good place to start. For example, many state siting statutes require 
either developers or a state siting board to examine a number of 
potential sites before making a final selection. This inventory of 
possible sites could be used as a starting point for identifying com-
parison sites and populations.270 Similarly, federal environmental 
statutes often require applicants to consider alternative locations 
and this information may be useful in defining appropriate compar-
ison populations. Additionally, the Recipient Guidance and 
Revised Investigation Guidance both encourage recipients to col-
lect pollution and demographic data and this may prove useful in 
selecting comparison populations.' If existing sources of informa-
tion fail to provide sufficient information about suitable compari-
son populations, the EPA has a responsibility under its Title VI 
guidance to gather any necessary data and evaluate whether a 
recipient's justifications are legitimate. 
A. State Siting Processes Often Generate Valuable Information 
About Comparison Areas 
Information generated by state siting statutes could often prove 
helpful to the EPA in determining an appropriate comparison pop-
ulation. However, as discussed below, there are limitations to the 
quality and quantity of information generated by state siting stat-
utes. For instance, siting statutes in different states take different 
procedural and substantive approaches in siting facilities. As a 
result, the amount of information about comparison locations or 
alternative sites is likely to vary from state to state. Furthermore, 
environmental justice advocates have argued that some of the 
information produced by industry or even state regulatory agencies 
may be biased, misleading, or actually falsified.271 Accordingly, the 
270 Mank, Reforming State Brownfield Programs, supra note 29, at 159-66. 
271 See Luke W. Cole, Remedies for Environmental Racism: A View from the Field, 90 
MICH. L. REV. 1991, 1994-95 (1992) [hereinafter Cole, Remedies for Environmental 
Racism] (arguing that agency-generated information regarding environmental impact often 
understates actual effect of proposed project); Fisher, supra note 35, at 324 n.203; Donald 
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EPA may need to encourage states to generate additional informa-
tion if existing regulations or siting .processes do not provide 
important information that the Agency needs for Title VI 
decisions. 
While each state siting statute is slightly different, there are three 
main approaches to siting: (1) super review, (2) site designation, or 
(3) 'local control.272 Each approach presents different issues 
regarding the generation of information about possible comparison 
sites. Unfortunately, there is no good study about the amount of 
siting information produced in each state or under the three differ-
ent siting approaches, but some possible inferences can be made 
from the limited amount of information available. 
Under super review, the developer of a proposed hazardous 
fa~ility selects a possible site and applies for a permit with the 
authorizing agency, typically a state EPA or Department of Natural 
Resources?73 If the state EPA decides to issue a permit after eval-
uating potential environmental impacts, the state appoints a special 
administrative body to conduct a super review of the permit and 
siting decision, and to evaluate objections by the applicant, host 
community or public.274 These special siting boards usually have 
some expert or technical members and some local representatives, 
but the composition of the boards and methods for selecting local 
representatives vary from state to state.275 There is normfllly some 
T. Hornstein, Lessons from Federal Pesticide Regulation on the Paradigms and Politics of 
Environmental Law Reform, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 369, 436-37 (1993) (discussing problems 
with falsified and misleading data on health effects of pesticides generated by' 
manufacturers). 
272 Mank, Discriminatory Siting, supra note 24, at 348-50; Rodolfo Mata, Hazardous 
Waste Facilities and Environmental Equity: A Proposed Siting Model, 13 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 
375, 401 (1994). 
273 See Mank, Discriminatory Siting, supra note 24, at 348; Mata, supra note 272, at 402-
05. 
274 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. ~ 22a-119 (2000); MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. 
~ 324.11117 (West 2000); N.Y. ENVTi... CO~SERV. LAW ~ 27-1105 (Gould 2000); OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 3734.05(C) (West 2000); WI. STAT. ANN. ~ 289.33 (West 2000) (providing for 
arbitration decision by waste facility siting board if applicant and local community are una-
ble to reach local agreement); Robert W. Collin, Environmental Equity: A Law and Plan-
ning Approach to Environmental Racism, 11 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 495, 511 (1992); Mank, 
Discriminatory Siting, supra note 24, at 348; Mata, supra note 272, at 401-05; Edward Pat-
rick Boyle, Note, It's Not Easy Bein' Green: The Psychology of Racism, Environmental 
Discrimination, and the Argument for Modernizing Equal Protection Analysis, 46 V AND. L. 
REV. 937, 971-73 (1993); Rachel D. Godsil, Note, Remedying Environmental Racism, 90 
MICH. L. REV. 394,403 (1991). 
275 See, e.g., MICH, COMPo LAWS ANN. ~ 324.11117(2) (West 2000) (establishing site 
review board with nine members and one nonvoting chairperson); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. 
LAW § 27-1105.3(d) (Gould 2000) (requiring governor to appoint facility siting board com-
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opportunity for the public to present their views about the site 
selection process to the siting board.276 If the siting board approves 
the site, then all of the states using a super review process have 
preemption clauses that permit the siting of the facility even if the 
local community objects.277 
A potential problem with "super review" is that the developer 
initially selects the proposed site and generates the information 
used in the review process. However, there are usually opportuni-
ties for the public to present additional information. Furthermore, 
it is not unusual for the siting board to request that the developer 
supply additional information about certain issues. 
Nevertheless, under super-review siting statutes, the developer 
generally provides most of the information and, as a result, there is 
at least some possibility of bias in favor of siting the proposed facil-
ity.27K Most communities lack the resources or expertise to chal-
lenge industry data, although the EPA or states sometimes provide 
relatively small technical assistance grants to community groupS.279 
Under the site designation approach, the state, not a private 
developer, creates an inventory of possible sites.2Ko Techniques for 
developing the inventory vary from state to state.281 Because site 
designation decreases the cost incentive in site selection and pro-
vides a statewide data gathering mechanism that can inform future 
environmental decision making to make sure no area is 
overburdened, site designation could provide more complete and 
less biased information than super review.282 However, state offi-
posed of commissioners of transportation, environmental transportation, health and com-
merce, the secretary of state, and three ad hoc members, at least two of which must be 
residents of county in which proposed facility is to be sited); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
* 3734.05(D) (West 2000) (setting forth membership criteria for siting board); Mank, Dis-
criminatory Siting, supra note 24, at 348; Godsil, supra note 274, at 404. See generally Mata, 
supra note 272, at 447-67. 
276 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. * 22a-119 (West 2000); Mank, Discriminatory Sit-
ing, supra note 24, at 348; Mata, supra note 272, at 402-05. 
277 Collin, supra note 274, at 511; Mank, Discriminatory Siting, supra note 24, at 348; 
Mata, supra note 272, at 411; Godsil, supra note 274, at 404. 
278 Kuehn, Quantitative Risk Assessment, supra note 27, at 133-39 (arguing industry can 
manipulate risk assessments to minimize proposal's possible risk to minority popUlations). 
279 Mank, Reforming State Brownfield Programs, supra note 29, at 166-68. 
280 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. §§ 7-401 to 7-413 (especially 7-409 and 7-410) 
(2000); Collin, supra note 274, at 512; Mank, Discriminatory Siting, supra note 24, at 349; 
Mata, supra note 272, at 405-07; Boyle, supra note 274, at 973-74; Godsil, supra note 274, at 
405-06. 
281 Collin, supra note 274, at 512; Mank, Discriminatory Siting, supra note 24, at 349; 
Godsil, supra note 274, at 405-06. 
282 Collin, supra note 274, at 512; Mank, Discriminatory Siting, supra note 24, at 349; 
Godsil, supra note 274, at 406. 
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cials may have their own biases because they often select inexpen-
sive sites to save money.283 
Some states allow local counties or municipalities to. control sit-
ing either directly or through local land use regulations. In these 
states, local land use regulations are not preempted by a state haz-
ardous waste management plan and a local community may usually 
impose land use regulations to block any hazardous waste site.2H4 
In states with local control, developers or state officials may have 
no incentive to genetate information about sites in any area that is 
likely to oppose siting. Accordingly, states with local control may 
generate less information about comparison sites than states using 
either super review or site designation. 
Additionally, several states have state environmental policy stat-
utes or regulations based on the National Environmental Policy 
Act that require them to consider alternative sites when the state 
builds a significant project.285 Similarly, other state envirorimental 
statutes or regulations may generate information about alternatives 
or comparison populations. 
As a result of their different siting approaches, states may not 
produce the same level of information about comparable sites or 
populations. To address this problem, the EPA could strongly 
encourage or even require states to develop information about 
alternative sites and comparable populations as part of their Title 
VI compliance process. There are a variety of techniques could use 
to gather such information, including through the identification of 
high-risk areas, community impact statements, or risk assess-
ments.2S6 Some of these are discussed in subsection C. 
283 See Mata, supra note 272, at 411-12. 
284 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-15-200.1 to 220, (West 2000) (especially § 25-
12-202(1), stating that an applicant for hazardous waste facility must seek certificate from 
county or municipality); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.723 (West 1997) (allowing limited local 
control subject to variance from Governor and state cabinet); IT Corp. v. Solano County 
Bd. of Supervisors, 1 Cal. 4th 810, 820 P.2d 1023 (1991) (holding California hazardous 
waste laws did not expressly or impliedly preempt county land use regulations); Mank, 
Discriminatory Siting, supra note 24, at 350; Mata, supra note 272, at 407-08; Godsil, supra 
note 274, at 406-07. 
285 See Alice Kaswan, Environmental Justice: Bridging the Gap Between Environmental 
Laws and "Justice", 47 AM. V.L. REV. 221, 293 n.358 (1997) (listing state statutes); see 
generally Stephen M. Johnson, NEPA and SEPA's in the Quest for Environmental Justice, 
30 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 565, 597-99 (1997) (stating several state environmental policy acts 
require state or local decision-makers to minimize or avoid harmful environmental 
impacts). 
286 Mank, Reforming State Brownfield Programs, supra note 29, at 159-66. 
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B. Federal Permitting Statutes: Analysis of Alternative Sites 
Under the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA")2H7 and 
several other federal environmental statutes, the EPA or another 
federal agency has to consider alternatives to a proposed site.2HH 
For example, the Army Corp of Engineers has issued regulations 
pursuant to section 404 of the Clean Water Act that require appli-
cants for wetlands permits to discuss whether there is a "practica-
ble alternative" to the wetland development proposal that would 
have a less adverse impact on the environment.28l) Similarly, appli-
cants for incidental take permits under the Endangered Species 
Act must discuss alternatives to any proposed action that may inci-
dentally harm endangered species.2l)O While the discussion of alter-
natives under various environmental statutes does not directly 
address the issue of comparison populations, in many instances, 
information about alternative sites could provide useful informa-
tion in determining comparison populations. 
C. The Recipient Guidance: Another Source of Information 
About Comparison Populations 
The Recipient Guidance is likely to provide additional useful 
information that the EPA could use to define appropriate affected. 
and comparison populations. If recipients do not produce enough 
useful information about potential comparison populations, the 
EPA could explicitly encourage recipients to address the issue of 
comparison populations. 
1. Conducting Adverse Impact and Demographic Analyses 
The Recipient Guidance recommends that recipients collect 
demographic and pollution data about potential high risk popula-
tions.291 The Recipient Guidance then encourages recipients to use 
that information to identify and address potential problem areas 
where there may be disparities on the basis of race, color, or 
287 42 U.S.c. §§ 4321-4347 (1982). 
288 See 42 U.S.c. § 4332(2)(C)(iii) (1982); 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (1978); 33 C.F.R. § 230.10 
(1993); Mank, Recipient Agencies, supra note 73, at 819-22. . 
289 See 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a)(3) (1993); Oliver A. Houck, Hard Choices: The Analysis oj 
Alternatives Under Section 404 oJthe Clean Water Act and Similar Environmental Laws, 60 
U. COLO. L. REV. 773 (1989). 
290 See 16 U.S.c.§ 1539(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2001) (requiring permit applicant to discuss "what 
alternative actions to such taking the applicant considered and the reasons why such alter-
natives are not being utilized."). 
291 Guidance, supra note 5, at 39,659; Mank, Draft Guidance, supra note 5, at 11,153. 
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national origin.292 The Recipient Guidance suggests that recipients 
begin with existing data, but cautions that they may need to collect 
additional local data if existing sources are inadequate.2Y3 Both the 
Recipient Guidance and the Revised Investigation Guidance dis-
cuss how recipients might conduct an adverse disparate impact 
analysis to identify areas of concern where there may be disparities 
on the basis of race, color, or national origin.2Y4 While these pro-
grams are in theory voluntary, it is likely that the EPA will strongly 
encourage states to collect such data to avoid discrimination 
problems. The pollution and demographic information and analy-
ses collected by recipients should be very helpful in determining 
the scope of affected populations. While this information may not 
directly address the issue of comparison populations, it is likely 
that some of this data would also be useful in assessing that issue as 
well. 
2. Area-Specific Agreements 
Both the Recipient Guidance and the Revised Investigation Gui-
dance encourage recipients to adopt an area-specific approach in 
which they identify geographic areas where adverse disparate 
impacts may exist and then create an "area-specific" plan to reduce 
or eliminate pollutants that are causing those harms.295 In both 
draft guidance, the EPA stated that it would give "due weight" to 
recipient efforts to reduce. discrimination in deciding whether a 
permit decision causes disparate impacts and, thus, violates Title 
VI,296 While recipients might submit a wide range of relevant 
information, the Agency expects that such evidence "should at a 
minimum generally conform to accepted scientific approaches."297 
Next, after recipients identify high-risk geographic areas, the EPA 
encourages states to cooperate with the affected communities in 
these areas and other appropriate stakeholders to develop the rele-
vant criteria to identify geographic areas where adverse disparate 
292 Guidance, supra note 5, at 39,659; Mank, Draft Guidance, supra note 5, at 11 ,153. 
m Guidance, supra note 5, at 39,659; Mank, Draft Guidance, supra note 5, at 11,153. 
294 Guidance, supra note 5, at 39,660-6\; Mank, Draft Guidance, supra note 5, at 11,153. 
295 Guidance, supra note 5, at 39,657, 39,662-63; Mank, Draft Guidance, supra note 5, at 
11,154-55. 
296 Guidance, supra note 5, at 39,653, 39,663; Mank, Draft Guidance, supra note 5, at 
11,155-56,11,163. 
297 Guidance, supra note 5, at 39,663; Mank, Draft Guidance, supra note 5, at 11,155, 
11,166. 
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impacts may exist.291l If the OCR finds'that reliable information 
shows that a reCipient's proposed "area-specific agreement" would 
o reduce adverse disparate impacts "to the extent required by Title 
VI," then the Agency would likely close the complaint.299 
Area-specific agreements are likely to provide useful informa-
tion about both affected populations and comparison populations. 
First, because area-specific agreements are intended to address 
areas with high levels of pollution, especially those with significant 
minority populations, state agencies are likely to identify areas 
with high levels of pollution and minority populations to avoid 
future Title VI complaints. As part of assessing those areas, the 
New Jersey experience suggests that states are likely to compare 
those areas with pollution levels for the general population.30o 
States need to take the. further step of considering whether sites are 
disproportionately located in minority areas compared to other 
areas that are similarly situated. In other words, states need to 
address the fundamental empirical question of whether more pol-
luting sites are located in high minority population areas compared 
to low-minority areas that would also be suitable for such sites. 
To increase the amount of information regarding area-specific 
plans, states should encourage public comment and participation 
before their adoption. While it generally encourages "meaningful" 
public participation, the Recipient Guidance provides few specific 
directions or requirements regarding what recipients must do to 
establish effective public participation programs.30l Some civil 
rights proponents argue that any area-specific plan should be 
adopted only after public notice and an opportunity for com-
ment.302 Requiring public notice-and-comment regarding area-
specific plans would make it more likely that such agreements 
298 Guidance, supra note 5, at 39,657; Mank, Draft Guidance, supra note 5, at 11,151, 
11,155-56. 
299 Furthermore, "[iJf a later-filed complaint raises allegations regarding other permit-
ting actions by the recipient that are covered by the same area-specific agreement, OCR 
would generally rely upon its earlier finding and dismiss the allegations." However, "[aJn 
exception to this general guideline would occur where there is an allegation or information 
revealing that circumstances had changed substantially such that the area-specific agree-
ment is no longer adequate or that it is not being properly implemented." Guidance, supra 
note 5, at 39,675-76; Mank, Draft Guidance, supra note 5, at 11,163. 
300 See Cook, supra note 190, at 2574 (discussing New Jersey model). 
30l See Mank, Draft Guidance, supra note 5, at 11,155-56. 
302 See Golden Gate University School of Law, Environmental Law & iustice Clinic, 
Comments on Draft Revised Guidance for Investigating Titll! VI Administrative Complaints 
Challenging Permits, Aug. 28, 2000, at 7 http':!!www,epa.gov!ocrpagelldocs!t6com2000_033. 
pdf; National Environmental iustice Advisory Commiuee Title VI Task Force, Comments on 
Draft Revised Guidance for Investigating Title VI Administrative Complaints Challenging 
424 Virginia Environmental Law Journal [Vol. 20:365 
would be based on a broad range of information and reflect the 
views of a diverse set of stakeholders. Accordingly, public notice-
and-comment would make it more likely that an area-specific plan 
would contain information relating to pertinent comparison 
populations. 
D. EPA Should Establish Criteria for Determining an 
Appropriate Comparison Population 
1. EPA Should Obtain Any Necessary Information 
As discussed above, both state and federal statutes, regulations, 
and programs may generate much of the information EPA needs to 
establish appropriate comparison populations. However, in evalu-
ating Title VI complaints filed with the Agency, the EPA in its 
Revised Investigation Guidance acknowledged that it bears the 
ultimate responsibility in investigating formal Title VI complaints 
even if the complainants and recipients fail to provide necessary 
information.303 Furthermore, the Agency in its Revised Investiga-
tion Guidance explains how it will select appropriate comparison 
populations.304 Accordingly, if any necessary information about 
comparison populations is not available, the EPA should take addi-
tional steps to collect the relevant data. 
2. EPA Should Evaluate a Recipient's Criteria for 
Appropriateness and Pretext 
The EPA should evaluate whether existing state siting require-
ments are relevant and appropriate before applying them to select 
comparison populations. To find a recipient in violation of the 
Agency's Title VI implementing regulations, the EPA must deter-
mine whether the recipient's practices or actions have caused 
"unjustified" adverse disparate impacts.30s Usually, a reCipient will 
offer a justification for any adverse disparate impacts. The Revised 
Investigation Guidance lists specific factors, including public 
Permits at 37 (Aug. 28, 2000) http://www.epa.gov/ocrpagelldocs/t6com2000_021.pdf [here-
inafter NEJAC]; Mank, Draft Guidance, supra note 5, at 11,155-56. 
303 Guidance, supra note 5, at 39,674 ("The process of investigating a Title VI complaint 
is not analogous to a judicial process in which plaintiffs and defendants must each present 
information and arguments supporting a particular finding. EPA, like other Federal agen-
cies, is responsible for investigating formal complaints concerning the administration of 
programs by recipients of financial assistance."); Mank, Draft Guidance, supra note 5, at 
11,162. 
304 See supra notes 98-115 and accompanying text. 
305 See Guidance, supra note 5, at 39,682-83; Mank, Draft Guidance, supra note 5, at 
11,170. 
2001] Proving an Environmental Justice Case 425 
health, environmental, or economic benefits, that may in appropri-
ate circumstances provide a sufficient compelling legitimate justifi-
cation for disparate impacts.306 Citing Title VII and Title VI cases, 
the Revised Investigation Guidance states: "Generally, the recipi-
ent would attempt to show that the challenged activity is reasona-
bly necessary to meet a goal that is legitimate, important, and 
integral to the recipient's institutional mission."307 
The Agency should carefully evaluate a recipient's siting criteria 
to determine whether they serve legitimate justifications as applied 
to the facts in the complaint. By assessing whether a recipient's 
siting criteria are legitimate, the Agency can decide whether it 
should use these criteria to select an appropriate comparison popu-
lation. For example, in Griggs, the Supreme Court concluded that 
Duke Power's educational and testing requirements were invalid 
because they were not sufficiently indicative of job performance.30Il 
Similarly, the EPA must decide whether the recipient's existing sit-
ing criteria are valid as applied to the facts of a Title VI complaint. 
Occasionally, otherwise legitimate criteria may not support a siting 
decision if the facts are carefully analyzed. For example, a recipi-
ent might justify placing a facility in a minority neighborhood 
because land is cheaper per acre. However, if a site in a mostly 
white, affluent suburban neighborhood would require less land 
than the minority site, then the suburban site might be cheaper 
overalPOY In that example, the lower cost per acre is not a valid 
justification for ignoring a less discriminatory alternative that 
would meet the recipient's legitimate needs. 
Sometimes, the Agency may face difficult questions in evaluating 
siting criteria. For example, a recipient's siting criteria may pro-
hibit a particular type of facility from locating near a school, hospi-
tal, or nursing home.3 IO Professor Robert Bullard, an African-
306 See Guidance, supra note 5, at 39,683; Mank, Draft Guidance, supra note 5, at 11,170-
71. . 
307 Guidance, supra note 5, at 39,683 & n.149 (citing Donnelly v. Rhode Island Bd. of 
Governors for Higher Educ., 929 F. Supp. 583, 593 (D.R.1. 1996), affd all other grounds, 
110 F.3d 2 (lst Cir. 1997)); Elston v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394,1412-13 
(11th Cir. 1993); see also NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 657 F.2d 1322, 1328 (3d Cir. 
1981); Mank, Draft Guidance, supra note 5, at 11 ,170-71. 
308 See supra notes 135-138 and accompanying text. 
309 See Steinberg, supra note 106, at 84. 
310 See, e.g., 30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 335.204(b)(6) (West 20Ot) (prohibiting siting of 
land treatment facilities within 1,000 feet of an "established residence, church, hospital, 
school, licensed day care center; surface water body used for a public drinking water supply 
or dedicated public park .... "); see generally Kaswan, supra note 285, at 287 n.323 (listing 
numerous state statutes containing various location standards for hazardous facilities). 
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American sociologist and leading environmental justice advocate, 
has argued that such siting criteria may be biased toward the selec-
tion of sites in minority and poor areas because these areas gener-
ally lack such institutions. On the other hand, other environmental 
justice advocates argue that minority areas are often selected as the 
sites for undesirable public institutions.311 Are criteria that Pro7 
hibit siting near certain public institutions based on valid safety 
concerns, or are they pretexts for discrimination? For each com-
plaint, the EPA should carefully examine whether such criteria 
truly serve important safety goals. If it is reasonable to site a facil-
ity near public institutions, then the EPA should include compari-
son areas that contain schools, hospitals or other similar public 
institutions. 
A further complication occurs when a siting requirement arises 
out of a legal ordinance that is beyond the recipient's jurisdiction. 
In many cases, a state environmental agency may not have author-
ity over zoning or traffic issues.312 Yet, during the twentieth cen-
tury, local zoning restrictions frequently served to concentrate 
minority populations in industrial and commercial areas.3l3 The 
Revised Investigation Guidance states that the Agency will con-
sider only impacts that are within the recipient's legal authority to 
regulate, and thus suggests that disparities· resulting from purely 
local zoning ordinances will often be beyond the scope of a recipi-
ent's Title VI responsibilities.314 However, the Revised Investiga-
tion Guidance also states that a recipient is responsible if it has the 
potential authority to prevent unjustified disparate impacts, but 
does not exercise thatauthority.315 Thus, a state agency might be 
responsible for discriminatory local land use regulations if it has 
the authority to preempt or regulate them. Furthermore, some 
311 In re Louisiana Energy Services, L.P. (Claiborne Enrichment Center), No. 70-3070-
ML,45 N.R.C. 367,388,1997 WL 458771 (N.R.C.), 1997 N.R.C. LEXIS 20 (Atomic Safety 
and Licensing Bd. May 1, 1997) (summarizing Dr. Bullard's expert testimony that siting 
criteria that exclude facilities near schools. hospitals, and nursing homes have the effect of 
increasing the likelihood that they are sited in poor and minority neighborhoods without 
such facilities), affd in part, rev:d in part, 1998 N.R.C. LEXIS 7 (Nuclear Regulatory 
Comm'n Apr. 3, 1998). 
m See Guidance, supra note 5, at 39,662; Mank, Draft Guidance, supra note 5, at 11 ,154. 
m See Arnold, supra note 28, at 80-89 (finding in a study of 31 census tracts in seven 
cities nationwide that industrial and commercial zoning is more common in low-income, 
high-minority neighborhoods than in high-income, low~minority neighborhoods); see also 
Rabin, supra note 28, at 101-20. 
314 See Guidance, supra note 5, at 39,654, 39,678; Mank, Draft Guidance, supra note 5, at 
11 ,165. 
315 See Guidance, supra note 5, at 39,654, 39,678; Mank, Draft Guidance, supra note 5, at 
11,165. 
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state and business officials fear the Agency could consider state 
constitutional authority or general state laws in determining the 
potential authority of a recipient agency and use that general 
authority in some states to make a state environmental agency 
responsible for local land use regulations or ordinances.316 The 
EPA needs to clarify when a recipient is responsible for practices 
that are potentially within its legal control, including local land use 
regulations. 
In particular, the role of local zoning restrictions is extremely 
important for selecting comparison populations. If local zoning' 
ordinances effectively prohibit certain types of facilities from an 
area, then the EPA probably should not use such jurisdictions for 
comparison populations because the recipient does not have the 
authority to site the facility at issue in those areas. Yet local zoning 
restrictions could have far greater disparate impacts than many sit-
ing criteria used by state environmental agencies.317 Because most 
municipal zoning boards do not receive funding from the EPA and 
are thus outside of the Agency's Title VI jurisdiction, the EPA's 
ability to stop or even influence current or historical discriminatory 
zoning practices is quite limited.3lR 
On the other hand, some states have state siting boards that can 
preempt local land use restrictions,3l9 and if such a siting board is a 
recipient of agency funding, then the EPA should require the board 
to exercise that authority. However, even in those states that have 
the authority to preempt local land use restrictions, local political 
opposition by wealthy, usually predominantly white communities is 
often effective in blocking undesirable facilities and relegating 
316 See BNEJ, supra note 17, at 15-16; ECOS, supra note 114, at 4-5; Mank, Draft Gui-
dance, supra note 5, at 11,154, 11,165. 
317 See Foster, supra note 36, at 833-37 (arguing historical patterns of zoning and housing 
have continuing impacts in locating hazardous facilities in poor and minority areas). 
318 In theory, the EPA could ignore local zoning and demand that recipients consider 
comparison areas that are effectively barred by local land use restrictions, but there would 
likely be a strong political reaction against the EPA by Congress, states, and local interests. 
Whenever the EPA has acted in a way that infringes on local autonomy in regulating land 
use, there has been a strong political reaction and the Agency has generally rescinded such 
efforts or been ordered by Congress to do so. For example, the EPA's program for regulat-
ing non-point sources of water pollution has been limited because a more expansive pro-
gram would restrict local land use regulations. President Reagan unsuccessfully tried to 
veto the relatively weak regulation of non-point pollution in Section 309 of the Clean 
Water Act, and there has been little progress since in controlling such pollution because of 
deference to local land use control. See ROGER W. FINDLEY & DANIEL A. FARBER, ENVI· 
RONMENTAL LAW 376-77 (5th ed. 1999). 
319 See supra notes 273-77 and accompanying text. 
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them to poor and minority neighborhoods.320 Thus, even if the 
EPA requires state environmental agencies to use their potential 
authority over loc'al land use regulation, the Agency may need to 
closely monitor whether these efforts are successfully 
implemented. 
The EPA should require recipients to do everything within their 
authority to combat discriminatory local land use practices. The 
EPA should carefully examine whether the recipient can preempt, 
mitigate, or avoid discriminatory local land use regulations. Never-
theless, the Agency's Title VI authority is limited to actions within 
the recipient's potential authority and thus the EPA may be power-
less to overcome long standing patterns of local discriminatory land 
use if the recipient has no practical means of addressing them. 
CONCLUSION 
In many cases, it would be easier for the EPA to simply use the 
general population or non-affected population as the appropriate 
comparison populations. However, the Supreme Court in Title VII 
cases has increasingly demanded that a plaintiff use only qualified 
job applicants in the relevant labor market as the proper compari-
son group rather than the general population.321 Because Title VI 
cases often rely on Title VII unless there is a strong reason for 
distinguishing the two statutes, it is likely that under Title VI any 
comparison population should be "similarly situated" to the 
affected population.322 Accordingly, the Revised Investigation 
Guidance is inconsistent with Title VI to the extent it suggests that 
the EPA can routinely use general population statistics without 
determining whether a comparison population is "similarly situ-
ated" to the affected population.323 
In environmental cases, the most important question regarding 
similarity is whether the facility at issue in the affected area could 
be sited in the comparison area, meeting all relevant minimum 
requirements. Business interests overstate the need for similarity 
when they contend that a comparison area must contain the same 
320 See Mank, Discriminatory Siting, supra note 24, at 349~51; Boyle, supra note 274, at 
973-74; Godsil, supra note 274, at 405-06. 
321 Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642, 650-55 (1989). 
322 See Elston v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1406-07 (11th Cir. 1993); 
TITLE VI LEGAL MANUAL, supra note II, at 27. 
32.1 See Guidance, supra note 5, at 39,681; Mank, Draft Guidance, supra note 5, at 11,169. 
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mix of urban, suburban, and rural areas as the affected area.324 On 
the other hand, if a project could only be built in certain areas, it is 
improper to use a comparison area that would be unsuitable for the 
project.325 
There are several ways to reduce the costs of selecting an appro-
priate comparison population. The EPA should work with recipi-
ents and complainants to develop such information. Because many 
state siting statutes already require a permit applicant to propose 
or consider a number of different locations for a proposed facility, 
existing siting and permitting processes already generate some of 
the information that would be useful in defining what is an appro-
priate comparison population.326 Additionally, several federal 
environmental statutes, most notably the National Environmental 
Policy Act, require the government and sometimes private appli-
cants for federal permits to consider alternatives. to their proposed 
project. This information could prove useful in selecting an appro-
priate comparison population.327 Furthermore, the EPA, in the 
Revised Investigation Guidance and Recipient Guidance, encour-
ages states to collect demographic information and pollution data 
about high risk populations and this information could prove useful 
in selecting both the affected population and an appropriate com-
parison population.328 
However, in investigating and evaluating Title VI administrative 
complaints, the EPA has ultimate responsibility in researching and 
resolving any disputed factual issues. If any necessary information 
about comparison populations is not available, the EPA should 
take additional steps to collect the relevant data. Finally, the EPA 
should develop guidelines for selecting appropriate comparison 
populations. The Agency should consider which factors are legiti-
mate objective criteria for siting decisions and selecting appropri-
ate comparison factors. Additionally, the Agency should carefully 
evaluate a recipient's criteria to determine whether they are pre-
texts for discriminatory decisions. Furthermore, the EPA should 
examine whether the recipient has the authority to control, limit or 
preempt local land use restrictions that have a discriminatory 
324 API, supra note 17, at 11; BNEJ, supra note 17, at 19-20; Mank, Draft Guidance, 
supra note 5, at 11 ,169; Steinberg, supra note 106, at 84-85. 
325 Been, Environmental Justice and Equity Issues, supra note 199, at § 25D.04 [3][g][i], 
at 90-92; Mank, Recipient Agencies, supra note 73, at 800-01, 826-28. 
326 Mank, Reforming State Brownfield Programs, supra note 29, at 159-66. 
327 See 42 U.S.c. §§ 4321-4347, supra note 287; 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (1997); 33 C.F.R. 
§230.10 (1997); Mank, Recipient Agencies, supra note 73, at 819-22. 
328 Guidance, supra note 5, at 39,659-61. 
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effect. By carefully analyzing siting criteria and selecting appropri-
ate comparison populations, the EPA can best fulfill its responsibil-
ity in evaluating disparate impact claims. 
